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 Chapter 6 
Critical Systems Heuristics1
 Werner Ulrich and Martin Reynolds 
Abstract Critical systems heuristics (CSH) is a framework for reflective professional
practice organised around the central tool of boundary critique. This paper, written
jointly by the original developer, Werner Ulrich, and Martin Reynolds, an experienced
practitioner of CSH, offers a systematic introduction to the idea and use of boundary
critique. Its core concepts are explained in detail and their use is illustrated by means
of two case studies from the domain of environmental planning and management.
A particular focus is on working constructively with tensions between opposing 
perspectives as they arise in many situations of professional intervention. These include
tensions such as ‘situation’ versus ‘system’, ‘is’ versus ‘ought’ judgements, concerns
of ‘those involved’ versus ‘those affected but not involved’, stakeholders’ ‘stakes’ versus
‘stakeholding issues’, and others. Accordingly, boundary critique is presented as a
participatory process of unfolding and questioning boundary judgements rather than as
an expert-driven process of boundary setting. The paper concludes with a discussion of
some essential skills and considerations regarding the practice of boundary critique.
 6.1  What Is CSH? 
A systems approach begins when first you see the world through the eyes of another.  
(C.W. Churchman 1968, p. 231) 
We do not need the systems concept at all if we are not interested in handling systems boundaries 
critically. (W. Ulrich 1996, p. 17) 
Critical systems heuristics (CSH) as developed by one of the authors (Ulrich  1983)
is a philosophical framework to support reflective practice. In its most simple 
1 Parts of the account of the NRUA-Botswana study in Section 6.2 of the present paper are repro­
duced from an earlier publication by one of the authors (Reynolds  2007); we are grateful to the
publishers of Edge Press, Point Reyes, CA, for granting us permission to reproduce this material.
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244 W. Ulrich and M. Reynolds 
formulation, CSH uses a set of 12 questions to make explicit the everyday judge­
ments on which we rely (consciously or not) to understand situations and to design 
systems for improving them. Table  6.1 describes the 12 questions.
The precise nature and use of these so-called boundary questions will be 
explained later. For now we can briefly summarise three basic reasons for raising 
them and hence, three reasons for using CSH. 
Table 6.1 The boundary categories and questions of CSH (Adapted from Ulrich 1996, p. 44) 
Sources of 
influence 
Boundary judgements informing a system of interest (S) 
Social roles 
(Stakeholders) 
Specific concerns 
(Stakes) 
Key problems
(Stakeholding issues) 
Sources of 
motivation
 1. Beneficiary 
Who ought to be/ 
is the intended 
beneficiary 
of the system (S)?
 2. Purpose 
What ought 
to be/is the 
purpose of S?
 3. Measure of 
improvement 
What ought 
to be/is S’s 
measure of 
success 
Sources of 4. Decision maker 5. Resources 6. Decision 
control Who ought to 
be/is in control 
of the conditions 
of success of S?
What conditions 
of success ought 
to be/are under 
the control of S?
environment 
What conditions 
of success 
ought to 
be/are outside 
the control 
of the decision 
maker? 
Sources of 
knowledge
 7. Expert 
Who ought to be/is 
providing relevant 
knowledge and 
skills for S?
 8. Expertise 
What ought to 
be/are relevant 
new knowledge 
and skills for S?
 9. Guarantor 
What ought to 
be/are regarded 
as assurances 
of successful 
implementation? 
Sources of 
legitimacy 
10. Witness 
Who ought to be/ 
is representing the 
interests of those 
negatively affected 
by but not involved 
with S? 
11. Emancipation 
What ought to 
be/are the 
opportunities 
for the interests 
of those negatively 
affected to have
12. Worldview 
What space 
ought to be/ 
is available 
for reconciling 
differing 
worldviews 
expression and 
freedom from the 
worldview of S? 
regarding S 
among those 
involved and 
affected? 
The 
involved 
The 
affected 
  
 
  
   
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
6 Critical Systems Heuristics	 245 
1. Making sense of situations: understanding assumptions and appreciating 
the bigger picture 
The boundary questions try to make sense of a situation by making explicit the 
boundaries that circumscribe our understanding. Such boundaries inform all our 
thinking about situations and systems; they constitute what in CSH we call our 
‘reference systems’ (a concept to be introduced a little later). Broadly speaking, the 
boundary questions may be understood to cultivate a more holistic awareness of 
situations with regard to these wide-ranging issues: 
–	 Values and motivations built into our views of situations and efforts to ‘improve’ 
them 
–	 Power structures influencing what is considered a ‘problem’ and what may be 
done about it
–	 The knowledge basis defining what counts as relevant ‘information’, including 
experience and skills; and
–	 The moral basis on which we expect ‘third parties’ (i.e., stakeholders not 
involved yet in some way concerned) to bear with the consequences of what we 
do, or fail to do, about the situation in question
In CSH, these four dimensions of problems or problem situations are called sources 
of motivation, control, knowledge, and legitimacy, respectively (see column 
‘sources of influence’ in Table  6.1 ). In sum, the 12 questions prompt an understand­
ing of the ‘bigger picture’.
2. Unfolding multiple perspectives: promoting mutual understanding 
The boundary questions (hereafter referred to as CSHq1–12) reveal  contrasting
judgements as to what aspects of a situation ought to be/are part of the picture we 
make ourselves of it and what other aspects ought to be/are left out. CSH calls 
these judgements boundary judgements. They offer a way to examine how we 
frame situations. When people talk about situations, it often happens that their 
views differ simply because they frame the situations differently; more often than 
not, people are unaware of this source of misunderstanding and conflict, and even 
if they are vaguely aware of it they do not know how to examine its influence 
systematically. Thus seen, CSH offers a tool for understanding the  multiple per­
spectives people bring into situations. By examining the different underlying 
boundary judgements, we can better understand people’s differences and handle 
them more constructively. 
As Table  6.1 suggests, we can identify and examine boundary judgements by
asking different kinds of questions. First, for each boundary category there are
two modes of question, a normative, ideal mode (i.e., what ‘ought’ to be…) con­
trasting with a descriptive, more realistic mode (what ‘is’ …). Second, judge­
ments can be contrasted among the four stakeholder groups associated with the
four sources of influence. So the set of judgements relating to intended beneficiaries
(CSHq1–3) can be compared with those relating to decision makers (CSHq4–6),
or experts (CSHq7–9), and/or witnesses (CSHq10–12). Third, at a more generalised 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
 
   
246 W. Ulrich and M. Reynolds 
level of analysis, judgements can be contrasted between those stakeholders
‘involved’ in the system design (CSHq1–9) and those ’affected’ by its conse­
quences but not involved (CSHq10–12). Fourth and last, moving onto an even
further generalised level, we can review an entire set of boundary judgements
(CSHq1–12) associated with any one reference system in the light of another set
of boundary judgements belonging to a different reference system. It is at this last
level of contrast that we can best begin to appreciate the phenomenon of people
talking at cross purposes or talking past each other. Put quite simply, such argu­
ments occur because people are using different reference systems. CSH helps to
reveal such practice.
3. Promoting reflective practice: analysing situations – and changing them 
The boundary questions support first of all an  analytical focus on understanding situa­
tions, by revealing to ourselves and to others the boundary judgements at work and
allowing everyone to understand their implications. Such understanding then also
enables a practical focus on ways to improve a situation, by engaging with people
having different perspectives. The aim in both cases is to enable  reflective practice, 
in a way that reaches beyond the usual, mainly psychological-introspective under­
standing of the concept (see Ulrich 2000 ;  2008) . Beyond supporting us (say, as pro­
fessionals or managers involved in an intervention) in disclosing and reviewing our
boundary judgements, CSH also supports uninvolved people in uncovering undis­
closed boundary judgements imposed on them by not so reflective professional or
managerial practice. The boundary questions can thus also be used with an emanci­
patory focus – allowing people to make their own authentic boundary judgements.
Before examining how CSH can be used in pursuing these three endeavours, it
may be helpful to situate CSH in the two main traditions of thought on which it
draws. The first is the tradition of  systems thinking of which the work of C.
West Churchman (1968 ; 1971 ; 1979) is representative. The widely cited remark of 
Churchman opening this chapter invites the question of the lens through which one 
might see the world differently. In CSH such a lens is referred to as a  reference 
system – a conceptual device circumscribed by the 12 boundary categories which 
in turn are defined in Table 6.1 by the boundary questions for which they stand. 
While Churchman preferred to envisage systems as real-world entities, he neverthe­
less provided the initial foundation categories adapted later for delineating a CSH 
reference system. He first identified nine ‘necessary conditions’ (approximately 
aligned with CSHq1–9) for conceiving of anything as a system in his book  The 
Design of Inquiring Systems (Churchman 1971 , p. 43), and later extended these to 
12 ‘planning categories’ in a book entitled  The Systems Approach and Its Enemies
(Churchman 1979 , p. 79f.). The three additional conditions are ‘systems philoso­
phers’, ‘enemies of the systems approach’, and ‘significance’; Churchman under­
stands them to raise issues related to the significance of a systems perspective as 
distinguished from the partial (because non-holist) perspectives of the ‘enemies’ 
(i.e., politics, morality, religion, and aesthetics; cf. Churchman  1979 , p. 80 and
p. 156). In strict CSH terms, they are critical ‘ideas’ for meta-level reflection about the 
  
 
    
     
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
6 Critical Systems Heuristics 247 
meaning of a systems approach rather than ‘categories’ for mapping any specific 
system (which is why CSHq10–12 are defined differently, as categories that are 
indeed constitutive of systems). 
Despite this difference of understanding, Churchman’s theme of the ‘enemies’ 
pointed the way to CSH’s notion of boundary critique, in an effort to give a precise 
methodological meaning to his credo ‘know (and love) thy enemy’. It also engendered 
an important heuristic device of CSH, the idea of maintaining tensions between 
contrasting perspectives for critical purposes; “we have to maintain the contradiction 
or else we allow ourselves to be overwhelmed by the consistent” (Churchman  1968 , 
p. 229; Ulrich 1983 , p. 275; Reynolds  2004 , p. 542). 
The second main tradition picked up in CSH is the tradition of  practical philosophy. 
This comprises two largely independent strands of philosophical thought. On the 
one hand, there is the tradition of American philosophical pragmatism as rooted 
in the works of Charles Peirce (1878) , William James (1907) and John Dewey 
(1925) . On the other hand there is the European tradition of  critical social theory
as found particularly in the works of Jurgen Habermas (e.g.  1972 and 1984 /87). 
Both strands of practical philosophy are to an important degree rooted in Immanuel 
Kant’s  (1787) critical philosophy, from which CSH derives many of its central 
concepts (see Ulrich 1983 , Chapters 3–5). The ‘American’ pragmatic perspective
of CSH means that it is oriented towards practical rather than theoretical ends; 
accordingly, CSH employs an  action-theoretical framework, that is, it looks at 
situations from the point of view of an agent rather than an observer. Its ‘European’ 
critical perspective means that CSH considers values – and value conflicts – as 
integral part of all claims to rational practice; it relies on a  discourse-theoretical
(or ‘discursive’) framework to assist users in dealing openly and critically with the 
value implications of boundary judgements. All these influences have been 
detailed elsewhere (see Ulrich 1983 ; 1987 ; 1988a ; 2001 ; 2003 ; 2004 ; 2006) . 
Ulrich is now developing the two pillars of pragmatism and critique into an
integrated framework of  critical pragmatism, as a basis for a future ‘philosophy 
for professionals’ (see 2006 ; 2007a, b) . 
The peculiar combination of these very rich traditions has enabled CSH to
significantly influence a strand of systems thinking and practice known as  critical 
systems thinking. The point of departure for a critical systems approach as we 
understand it lies in the simple notion that all approaches, methodologies, methods, 
whether described as systems or something else, are partial, in the dual sense
of (i) representing only a section rather than the whole of the total universe of
possibly relevant considerations, and (ii) serving some parties better than others 
(Ulrich 2002 , p. 41;  2005 , p. 2). No specific proposal, no decision, no action, no 
system can get a total grip on the situation and get it right for everyone (Reynolds 
2008a) . The implication is that using a ‘systems approach’ requires us (i) to consider 
systematically what our systems maps or designs may leave out and (ii) to always 
examine them from multiple perspectives. 
CSH is a critical systems approach developed to embrace this dual sense of 
partiality head-on. Let us see, then, how it attempts to provide this reflective lens.
    
  
 
 
 
 
 
248 W. Ulrich and M. Reynolds
 6.2  Applying CSH 
6.2.1  Two Studies in Applying CSH 
CSH can support professional interventions in two general ways: it can help us to 
evaluate an intervention, or it can  inform the methodologies used for intervention. 
The two interventions we describe are similar in that they both deal with complex 
situations of natural resources planning and management; they differ, however, in 
that they employ CSH for these two alternative purposes. The first project, an 
evaluation study of NRUA (‘Natural Resource-Use Appraisal’), was part of a wider 
study by Reynolds  (1998) exploring participatory planning for rural development 
in Botswana. The NRUA study examined how CSH could help evaluate existing 
practices in natural resource-use management with a particular view to poverty 
alleviation. The second project, ECOSENSUS – an acronym for ‘Electronic/ 
Ecological Collaborative Sensemaking Support System’ – involved both authors 
and explored how a number of computer-assisted tools, among them CSH, could 
support participatory environmental decision making by geographically distributed 
stakeholder groups in remote rural areas of Guyana (Berardi et al.  2006 ; Reynolds 
et al. 2007) . Before discussing the use of CSH in these two projects, a brief general 
description of their context and of the reasons for employing CSH may be useful. 
6.2.1.1  NRUA-Botswana 
Botswana is about the size of France or Kenya, despite supporting a relatively 
small population of less than two million people. It is classified as being semi-arid 
with most of the surface area being a harsh environment of land covered by the 
Kalahari sands, making it difficult to practice commercially sustainable agricul­
ture. Natural resource use involving agriculture (livestock and arable) and wildlife 
utilisation is constrained further by a shortage of surface water, along with low and 
variable patterns of rainfall. The country’s relative political stability in a volatile 
region is underpinned by the wealth generated by the  non-renewable natural 
resource sector – particularly diamonds. However, over two thirds of the popula­
tion live in rural areas and are variously engaged with livelihood activities based 
on renewable natural resource use. 
Since the early 1990s considerable attention has been given to promoting partici­
patory planning in less-developed countries as a means of alleviating poverty in the 
rural areas and protecting the natural environment. During the 1990s the national 
government in Botswana, in partnership with a number of donor agencies, was 
actively piloting participatory forms of rural appraisal, as an alternative to conven­
tional large-scale survey techniques and scientific monitoring procedures. The idea 
was to rely less on scientific techniques such as large-scale surveys and monitoring, 
and more on the knowledge and concerns of local people. The most popular 
approach amongst development practitioners at the time was Participatory Rural 
    
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
6 	 Critical Systems Heuristics 249 
Appraisal (PRA), an approach known mainly through the work of Robert Chambers 
(1994a, b ;  1997) . PRA can be described as a set of participatory methods and tech­
niques, from visualization and interview techniques to group-dynamic methods, 
used to elicit and structure the knowledge and concerns of stakeholders. 
Referring to the two kinds of applications mentioned at the outset, CSH could 
basically support PRA interventions in two ways:
 1. 	  We might want to use CSH within the framework of PRA, as yet another method for
eliciting and structuring responses. Such a use might not do full justice to the larger
philosophical framework and spirit of CSH; but it might still complement PRA’s
basket of methods in some essential ways, by adding the missing dimension of
critically-discursive tools (i.e., tools to support processes of critical reﬂ ection and
discourse on the value implications of alternative proposals) and indirectly also by
drawing the attention of facilitators and users of PRA to this dimension. CSH would
thus inform the use of PRA in a way that might make a real difference.
 2. 	  We might want to use CSH in addition to approaches like PRA, as a wider philo­
sophical and methodological framework for analyzing the process and outcome 
of PRA interventions. This use is independent of the previous one – it makes 
sense regardless of whether CSH was used in the analyzed interventions them­
selves. CSH would thus serve to  evaluate the use of PRA and similar participa­
tory approaches in speciﬁc interventions, with a view to assessing their outcomes 
as well as modifying participatory planning in general.
The use of CSH in the NRUA study reported here was of the second kind; the aim 
was not to modify PRA but rather, to evaluate its use and outcome in three partici­
patory planning projects of that time in Botswana. CSH served as the principal 
framework for all three evaluations. 
The reasons for applying CSH as a framework for evaluating participatory plan­
ning in Botswana were: 
–	 CSH should help reveal the limitations of the NRUA project projects with regard 
to its claim of being inclusive and holistic;
–	 CSH should prompt a critical awareness among those involved in participatory 
development projects such as NRUA as to what interests were given prominence 
and which others were marginalised; and
–	 CSH should suggest ways in which ‘participatory’ planning might be improved 
to incorporate more responsible professional intervention.
6.2.1.2 ECOSENSUS-Guyana 
The Makushi tribal region situated in the Rupununi River catchment area in Guyana 
is the size of south east England and contains one of the highest diversities of ani­
mal and plant species in the world. The region is under intense pressure by govern­
ment as well as international corporations to expand the exploitation of its
natural resources, including timber, gold, and commercially viable fish species. 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
250 W. Ulrich and M. Reynolds 
The indigenous Makushi Amerindians in Guyana are personally affected by many of
the land-use projects in Guyana’s North Rupununi District without being directly 
involved. 
ECOSENSUS was conceived as a preliminary study to explore the potential of 
providing better support to such communities than is possible with conventional 
project-orientated management and its predominant reliance on scientific and tech­
nological expertise. For example, conventional GIS (geographic information sys­
tem) applications as well as other e-science tools have largely focused on scientific 
and technological issues, whereas wider socio-economic issues that arise with land­
use and development planning have traditionally been beyond the reach of such 
tools. Along with participants drawn from the community of Makushi Amerindians 
and the two authors, the study involved a small number of environmental scientists 
and software experts from Europe and Guyana. 
The reasons for applying CSH in ECOCENSUS were: 
–	 CSH should offer an opportunity for revealing and promoting wider stakeholder 
interests in the preservation and development of the Rupununi wetlands;
–	 CSH should serve as a meaningful tool for communicating about the use and 
preservation of natural resources; and
–	 CSH should enable more sustainable planning and sustainable development of 
the wetlands. 
6.2.2 Using CSH as an Intervention Tool: Some Basic Concepts 
The descriptions above give the broad contexts in which CSH was applied,
along with the reasons why in each case CSH was considered relevant. But
what methodological conjectures make us believe that CSH is an intervention
tool that supports such demanding aims? Before examining the two studies in
detail, it is necessary to first clarify some basic concepts associated with the use
of CSH.
We have already hinted at the basic aims that we associate with CSH (see  What is
CSH? ). With its conceptual framework of boundary categories and questions (as
shown in Table  6.1 above) and a number of supporting concepts and guidelines, CSH
offers a systematic structure for making sense of situations, unfolding multiple 
perspectives, and promoting reflective practice. Methodologically speaking, CSH
uses the boundary questions to uncover the  reference systems that inform our views
of both problem situations and options for improving them. In the form of explicit
reference systems, CSH provides a means of well-structured ‘conversation’ between
systems and situations. In the language of CSH, the aim and nature of that conversa­
tion consists in  systematic boundary critique. The relationship of ‘systems’ and ‘situ­
ations’ and the concept of ‘reference systems’ will be introduced first; ‘boundary
critique’ will then be explained in  the subsequent main section 6.2.3 titled A core
concept of CSH: systematic boundary critique. 
  
   
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
   
 
 
 
 
6 Critical Systems Heuristics 251 
6.2.2.1  Systems Versus Situations 
Among contemporary systems practitioners – particularly in the two traditions of 
soft and critical systems thinking – it is widely acknowledged that ‘systems’ are 
essentially conceptual constructs rather than real-world entities. Systems concepts 
and other constructs help us describe and understand the complex realities of real­
world situations, including natural, technical, social, psychological or any other 
aspects that might potentially or actually be relevant at any one time. 
Acknowledging the  fundamental divide between systems and reality is basic to
contemporary systems practice. Particularly SSM (soft systems methodology;
Checkland 1981) and CSH understand systems as conceptual tools for learning about
reality, rather than as being part  of reality itself. However, CSH handles the distinction
a bit differently from SSM. While in soft systems thinking, practitioners are supposed
to reflect on their systems conceptions, and feasible interventions to be based on
them, by ‘comparing’ them with the real-world situation perceived to be problematic,
CSH interrogates the notion of a ‘perceived situation’ itself. CSH makes problematic
‘the situation perceived to be problematic’, so as to help practitioners see through
their underpinning assumptions. In doing so, CSH handles the distinction of ‘system’
and ‘situation’ not so much as an absolute opposition between an epistemological
construct and an ontological reality but rather as a  continuum between two poles of
contrasting proximity to reality; one pole being closer to the ‘real’ than the other but
both belonging to an epistemological domain of talking about a reality that we cannot
grasp in any direct and strictly objective way. The reason is, whenever we talk of
‘situations’ and ‘systems’ we are always already abstracting from the infinitely rich
‘real world’ and using judgement to  select some aspects we assume to be particularly
relevant. That is, both poles are always involved, although to a different extent – with
varying degrees of proximity and selectivity – and in different ways – with a descriptive
versus prescriptive intent. CSH uses three interrelated terms to refer to varying
degrees of proximity to reality:
 1. Maps: These commonly (but not necessarily always) assume quite close proximity
to reality. Typical examples can be found in everyday life (e.g. road maps), in 
regional and environmental planning (e.g. zone maps), and in the natural sciences 
(e.g. in biology, maps of cellular organisation or the double-helix of DNA). A good
map tries to approximate some section of reality as much as is feasible and
required by the map’s purpose; but it should not have us take the map for the 
reality itself. A good map will therefore make explicit its underlying assumptions 
(e.g. in a geographical map, its coordinates, scale, and symbols). Maps should 
serve as signposts to reality but should never be taken for that reality itself.
2. Designs: These are less proximate to reality than are maps; they serve as signposts
pointing to how the real world  might be or ‘ought’ to be, which includes everything
from detail improvements in existing maps to radically new and encompassing
visions for the future (also called ‘ideal maps’ in CSH). A good design tries to give
us critical distance to reality, as a basis for developing alternative futures. Designs
embody an implicit critique of the present, for we cannot understand what consti­
tutes an improvement over the present without seeing its shortcomings.
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
252 W. Ulrich and M. Reynolds
 3. Models: These are heuristic devices for engaging with reality in terms of mapping 
or design. ‘Model’ is a generic term that emphasises the abstraction from reality 
involved rather than the speciﬁc purpose for which the abstraction is made. 
‘Model’ is the least speciﬁc term of the three. Among the heuristic devices to 
which it refers, we might also count the methods we use to construct maps and 
designs. CSH would then itself be a model.
To avoid a blurring of terms, CSH refers to the notions we make ourselves of a 
relevant context of intervention as ‘maps’ or ‘designs’ and of CSH itself as a  framework
for reflective practice or a  methodology of critical systems thinking. 
The important point in conceiving of professional intervention in terms of
mapping and design is this. However close to reality our maps and designs may be 
or claim to be, we must never, as Alfred Korzybski  (1933 , p. 750) once famously 
said, confuse the ‘map’ with the ‘territory’. Now this applies also to our perception 
of the territory, which is itself a kind of map! Accordingly, CSH assumes that “all 
our knowledge is in terms of maps” (Ulrich  1983 , p. 185). Counter to what is often 
assumed, we can then not simply align ‘situations’ with the ‘territory’ and ‘systems’ 
with the ‘maps’ or ‘designs’ we make of it. Whatever we can think and say about 
a situation, it already contains some mapping and/or design elements. ‘Situations’ 
and ‘systems’ stand for different degrees of abstraction and conceptualisation rather 
than for a strict opposition of the ‘territory’ (an ontological concept) and ‘maps’ or 
designs (an epistemological concept). We might say we speak of ‘situations’ when 
we mean a low-level conceptualisation – a notion of the real world that remains 
close to ordinary perception – whereas when we speak of ‘systems’, we mean a 
higher-level conceptualisation in which we make conscious and careful use of the 
systems concept along with other abstractions. 
We should, then, not expect that we can ever validate or test systems maps and 
designs by comparing them with ‘the situation’, as if the latter provided an independent 
touchstone. Rather, from a critical point of view, our notion of the situation is itself 
a map and thus is likely to be conditioned by the same sort of selectivity that 
informs the map or design in question. We can, however, use differences between 
maps (or between designs) to drive our thinking about the underlying judgements 
that lead to these different models. 
Ultimately, what matters is not the terms we use but the way we use them.
For example, terms such as hydraulic systems, legal systems, ecosystems, inven­
tory systems, financial systems etc. are often used as descriptors (‘maps’) of the 
real world, and there is no reason why we should ignore such common use of 
language or deviate from it. Likewise, systems for traffic control, for timetabling, 
for mitigating climate change, for poverty alleviation, for bringing up children etc. 
are often expressed as planning devices (‘designs’). And of course, all such systems 
might also be regarded as ‘models’. For the sake of simplicity, we may even con­
tinue to refer to the ‘territory’ as the ‘situation’ or ‘context’, as it is common prac­
tice in the systems literature, at least so long as we mean to refer to its basically 
ill-defined and ill-structured nature which still awaits careful definition – the 
‘mess’, using Ackoff’s  (1981) well-known term. But as soon as we begin to define 
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
6 Critical Systems Heuristics 253 
and structure the situation in some way, for example as a  problem situation, or as a 
certain context  that matters, or as relevant territory, then systems conceptions of 
some kind are already at play. In CSH terms these are called  reference systems. 
6.2.2.2  Reference Systems 
To say that all our knowledge is in terms of maps is equivalent to saying that it is 
selective with regard to the aspects of the (undefined) territory or (defined) situation 
that it considers. Consequently, the crucial methodological issue for CSH is that in 
everything that we can think and say about the ‘situation’ at issue or a ‘system’ of 
concern, selectivity is at work. Reflective practice requires that we make ourselves 
and everyone concerned aware of this selectivity; for once our systems maps and 
designs become a basis for action, selectivity turns into  partiality – it means that 
some parties will be better served than others, and still others may merely have to 
bear disadvantages. 
The point is not that we ought to avoid selectivity – we can’t. The point is, rather, 
that we should handle the selectivity of our maps and designs carefully, lest we 
deceive ourselves and others about their meaning and validity. Identifying and 
analysing our reference systems systematically is a methodologically rigorous way 
of putting into practice Churchman’s observation cited at the outset: “A systems 
approach begins when first you see the world through the eyes of another.”
By analogy, a  critical systems approach begins when we first appreciate the 
ways our systems maps or designs depend on the reference systems we assume, 
whether consciously so or not. This does justice to the insight that the real world as 
such (the territory) is beyond what any conceivable method of inquiry can reveal to 
us in a secure and definitive way. Any conception we may have of it remains for 
ever open to doubt, contestation, and redefinition. There is an element of freedom 
involved: nobody can claim to advance the single right and objective map! This 
element of freedom does not imply, however, that all reasonable discussion about 
different maps and designs must stop here. The contrary is true: we may and should 
indeed argue and discourse about different maps and designs, to make sure we 
understand why and how exactly they differ – the different lenses they use to grasp 
the territory, as it were – and what implications these differences may have for all 
the parties concerned. The only ‘stop signal’ is one that prohibits indifference and 
intolerance in the way we handle our boundary judgements; for once we have
understood the role of the reference systems they constitute, we can never again 
reasonably claim to own a monopoly for the single right view of the situation or the 
way to improve it – a common shortcoming even in professional practice. 
In a sense, then, we can agree with Slavoj Žižek  (1989 , p. 21), who in his psy­
choanalytical work observes that ‘the Real’ is an extra-discursive realm, a realm 
apart from any of the constructs of ‘realities’ that we can talk about and which at 
bottom are inevitably ideological (‘ideological’ in the widest sense of the word: we 
make up ‘reality’ through our own ideas, depending on our interests and needs). 
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“Ideology is not simply a ‘false consciousness’, an illusory representation of reality, 
it is rather this reality itself which is already to be conceived as ‘ideological’.” 
Simply put, what is real we cannot talk about except through some lens, and the 
lens is at bottom ideological. 
Žižek’s observation is another way to remind us that in all our efforts to grasp 
situations, we map reality through some lens, the origin and exact nature of which 
lies in an extra-discursive realm. What is new in CSH is that it offers us a way of 
drawing the lens at least partly into the discursive realm. Through the analysis of 
underpinning reference systems, we acquire a shared language or literacy by means 
of which we can identify and unfold the normative implications of the lens system­
atically. In the language of CSH, we can thus understand partiality in terms of 
underlying selectivity. Although we may not ultimately fully understand the psy­
chological and ideological forces behind that selectivity, we can and should never­
theless undertake a systematic effort to make ourselves and all those concerned 
aware of the partiality that it implies in a specific situation. Furthermore, although 
we cannot claim to talk about reality as such, it makes nevertheless sense – and is 
indispensable from a critical point of view – to talk about the different lenses people 
use, namely, in the form of (conscious or unconscious) reference systems. After all, 
what other means do we have, if not reflection and discourse, to improve mutual 
understanding about our differences? 
How, then, does CSH operationalise this notion of a reference system? A basic
definition is this:  a reference system is ‘the context that matters when it comes to
assessing the merits and defects of a proposition’ (Ulrich 2000 , p. 251). ‘Context’
here means quite generally all those aspects of a situation that influence our
appreciation of it, before and beyond any particular conceptualisation or model­
ling effort; whereas by ‘reference system’ we mean an explicit conceptualisation
of ‘a context that matters’ as circumscribed by the four sources of influence
(Table 6.1 ).
A specific reference system can thus also be described as  the set of answers that 
we give to the 12 boundary questions and by which we determine the basic sources 
of selectivity at work in our systems’ maps and designs – the sources of motivation, 
of control, of knowledge and of legitimacy informing our views. Note, however,
that the purpose of the boundary questions is a purely critical one: the aim is boundary 
surfacing and review (i.e., making us aware of and reflect on boundary assump­
tions) rather than boundary setting (i.e., doing away with boundary questions by 
fixing the answers) – a frequent misunderstanding of CSH that we need to avoid. 
The point is not that we should claim we have the answers but rather, that we should 
uncover the inevitable selectivity of all our claims. 
The idea that reference systems, as operationalised in CSH, inform all our maps 
of situations or designs for changing them, can shed some new light on the tension 
of ‘system’ and ‘situation’ about which we have been talking. Figures 6.1 and 6.2
illustrate the different light CSH sheds on the issue of handling the map-territory 
distinction, as compared to conventional systems thinking.
In the terms of Fig. 6.2 , where might we locate problem situations and refer­
ence systems in the two case studies? In the NRUA-Botswana study, the problem
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situation: 
the real world as 
I/we/others perceive it 
and against which we 
test or compare our 
systems models 
System “a conceptual 
model that I use to learn 
about the real world” 
Conventional 
systems thinking 
systems thinking: 
Systems models are understood as devices for learning about 
a real-world situation perceived to be problematic, by reducing 
complexity and allowing well-structured analysis and discussion 
about desirable and feasible change. The problem perception itself is 
not questioned systematically, as the modelling tools offer little 
support for analysing its selectivity and appreciating the resulting 
Working with the tension of system and situation in conventional 
partiality of action to improve the situation. 
 Fig. 6.1  System and situation in ‘conventional’ systems thinking 
situation can be described in terms of the role of participatory planning in rural
development. The central issue was, how did participatory planning in Botswana
change the ways in which issues of value, power, expertise and moral engagement
were handled; did it actually create opportunities to improve the reference sys­
tems at work? The focus was on evaluating existing systems of participatory
planning.
In the ECOSENSUS-Guyana study, the problem situation might be described in 
more challenging terms which include the possibility of impoverished marginalised 
groups to have a greater ‘say’ (or meaningful involvement) in the mapping, design, 
and modelling of their livelihood strategies. The central issue was, how might 
stakeholders in a situation of marginalisation better engage with issues of value, 
power, expertise and moral dilemmas as they arise with their use of natural 
resources in fragile ecosystems? The focus was on learning to question the reference 
systems at work and to make transparent and constructive use of them in communicating 
with other stakeholders.
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situation: 
a multiplicity of 
alternative contexts 
(conceptions of the 
relevant territory) that 
might matter to 
me/us/others 
Reference system: “a context 
that matters (to me/us/others) 
in assessing a systems map or 
design” 
Systematic 
boundary critique 
Working with the tension of system and situation in CSH: 
Situations as well as systems maps or designs are understood as 
expressions of an underlying reference system, by which people 
frame situations differently and selectively. Systematic analysis 
and discussion requires boundary critique, an effort to unfold 
the built-in selectivity of people’s grasp of situations, so as to 
appreciate the resulting partiality of systems maps or designs 
and to improve mutual understanding of differences and options for 
cooperative action. 
 Fig. 6.2  System and situation in ‘critical’ systems thinking 
6.2.3 A Core Concept of CSH: Systematic Boundary Critique 
Boundary critique is defined in CSH as a systematic – reflective and discursive –
effort of handling boundary judgements critically, whereby ‘critically’ means both 
‘self-critically’ questioning one’s  own claims and ‘thinking for oneself’ before 
adopting the claims of others. Boundary critique involves first of all a  process of 
unfolding, that is, making ourselves and others aware of the boundary judgments 
assumed with respect to the 12 kinds of boundary judgements listed in Table  6.1 . 
The concept of unfolding is adopted from the writings of Churchman (esp. 1979 ; cf.
Ulrich  1988b , and Reynolds 1998) . But Churchman used it in a somewhat different 
sense. In Churchman’s systems thinking, ‘unfolding’ was essentially a metaphor 
for the holistic orientation of what he called more accurately the sweep-in process; 
the aim was to include in our systems notions ever more aspects of the real world 
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so as to achieve a ‘whole systems’ view of a problem situation. In CSH, by contrast, 
the process of unfolding is a specific tool for uncovering the inevitable  selectivity
of all our systems maps and designs; that is, it serves a critical purpose against all 
holistic pretensions (cf. Ulrich 2004 , p. 1127f). Behind this distinction are two dif­
ferent strategies for dealing with the unavoidable tension between systems and
situations: overcoming or minimizing selectivity in Churchman’s systems thinking, 
embracing selectivity openly and critically in CSH. 
In addition to the process of unfolding, systematic boundary critique involves a
second effort, the systematic  questioning of boundary judgements with respect to their
adequacy in terms of relevance, justification, and ethical defendability. Whereas the
aim of ‘unfolding’ consists in uncovering the selectivity of the reference systems at
work in our claims, the aim of ‘questioning’ consists in exploring and, if necessary,
challenging their resulting partiality. To this end, boundary questioning requires that
we thoroughly analyse actual and possible consequences and ask what they may mean
for all the parties concerned; and furthermore, that we examine what options may be
available that might provide a better basis for mutual understanding and cooperative
action towards ‘improving’ the situation. Note that once again, in pursuing this quest
for value clarification, the strategy of CSH is different from that of Churchman’s systems
approach: while Churchman sought the source of rationality for our claims in systems
thinking itself, CSH seeks it in legitimate processes of discourse and decision-making
informed by critical systems thinking (for a full discussion of CSH’s underlying 
concept of a merely ‘critical solution’ of the problem of boundary judgements, see
Ulrich 1983 , entire Chapter 5). The step from holistic to critical systems thinking
implies that “systems practice should not misunderstand itself as a guarantor of
socially rational decision making; it cannot, and need not, ‘monologically’ justify the
social acceptability of its designs.” (Ulrich  1988a , p. 158)
 6.2.3.1  Unfolding Boundary Judgements 
We have understood that the process of unfolding aims to uncover the  selectivity of 
the reference systems at work in our systems maps and designs or in any other 
propositions we make or face in a professional intervention, for example, problem 
definitions, criteria for improvement, proposals for action, evaluations of success, etc. 
For the sake of both simplicity and accuracy, CSH refers to all these propositions 
as ‘claims’, for they all imply a claim to the validity and relevance of what is 
proposed. We constantly need to judge the validity and relevance of claims; but we 
can reasonably do this only to the extent we are aware of the selectivity built into 
them in the form of boundary judgements. Only then can we fully understand
the partiality that such selectivity implies in a specific context of application
(the intervention context), in the form of consequences with which the different 
parties concerned may have to live with. 
How, then, can we learn to unfold selectivity? The basic idea should be clear by 
now: we can do this by examining the ways in which specific claims are conditioned 
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by boundary judgements. For example, the claim that participatory planning in 
NRUA-Botswana is ‘good’ might be revised when examining the various boundary 
judgements associated with the claim in a particular context. Similarly, in 
ECOSENSUS-Guyana, a claim that environmental planners work on behalf of 
marginalised communities may be quite a partial view when examined in the
context of other reference systems. 
To help us identify and unfold boundary judgements  systematically, CSH pro­
poses the 12 boundary questions listed in Table  6.1 . They are methodologically 
grounded in a reconstruction of Kantian a priori science, which represents the 
epistemological basis of Kant’s critical philosophy (see Ulrich  1983 , Chapters 
3–5); but this philosophical justification need not concern us here, as it is quite suf­
ficient for convincing ourselves of their critical relevance that we start applying 
them to situations of professional or everyday decision-making and thus experience 
that they do indeed make a difference to our accustomed ways of thinking and argu­
ing about problem situations and solution proposals. You will soon discover that 
thinking in terms of boundary questions allows you to come up with new and rel­
evant conjectures and questions. At the very latest when others first ask you how it 
is you come up with such questions, you know you are on your way to becoming a 
practitioner of boundary critique! 
In what order should one try to answer the boundary questions? Basically, due 
to the interdependence of the boundary categories, we may begin the process of 
unfolding with any one of the boundary categories that we find particularly relevant 
or easy to specify, and can then follow the line of thought that develops. However,
beginners find it often useful to follow a  standard sequence. We have found it use­
ful (both in our teaching and professional practice of boundary critique) to follow 
the sequence suggested in Fig. 6.3 , beginning with the interests of intended or 
actual beneficiaries (the sources of motivation, that is) and then thinking through 
the sources of control, knowledge, and legitimacy in this order, each time beginning 
with the concerns of the relevant stakeholders. Box 6.1 takes you through a
corresponding short narrative of unfolding CSH questions.
The sequence works both with the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ boundary questions.
Experience suggests it is easier for many people to begin reflecting and com­
municating about their ‘ought’ answers, that is, their hopes and visions for the
kind of change to be brought about in a situation, rather than analysing ‘is’
boundary judgements at the outset. This holds true especially in group settings;
people who do not know one another well can ‘warm up’ and develop a sense
of mutual trust and cooperation as they reveal to each other their visions for
improvement, while at the same time familiarizing themselves with the spirit of
boundary critique. Furthermore, this way of proceeding has the advantage that
when it comes to the ‘is’ questions, the normative basis from which ‘is’ answers
are to be assessed has already been clarified, so that an illusion of objectivity is
avoided from the start.
Let us briefly highlight the material issues at which the 12 boundary questions 
aim. As you may recall, they are grouped into four basic sets of boundary issues or 
sources of selectivity that inform any reference system: 
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Sources of 
influence 
Motivation 
Control 
Knowledge 
Legitimacy 
Social roles Specific Key problems 
(Stakeholders) concerns (Stakeholding 
(Stakes) issues) 
1 Beneficiary/ client  2 Purpose 3 Measure of improvement 
4 Decision maker  5 Resources 6 Decision environment 
7 Expert  8 Expertise 9 Guarantor 
10 Witness 11 Emancipation 12 Worldview
 Fig. 6.3 Standard sequence for unfolding the boundary questions of CSH (Adapted from 
Reynolds  2007 , p. 106) 
1. 	  Sources of motivation – where a sense of purposefulness and principle value 
comes from
2. 	  Sources of control – where the necessary resources and power are located
3. 	  Sources of knowledge – where sufﬁcient expertise and experience is assumed to 
be available
4. 	  Sources of legitimacy – where social and legal approval is assumed to reside
Identifying these four sources of selectivity is essential for gaining a sense of ori­
entation: “What is the intervention all about?” It is equally essential for assessing 
and qualifying the claims that we or others associate with the intervention:  “What 
exactly does the intervention claim to achieve and what are its built-in limitations, 
that is, the assumptions and conditions on which its ‘success’ depends?”
It is always recommended to consider all four sources of selectivity, for  together
they constitute the reference system assumed. They embody the four basic and 
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unavoidable kinds of boundary issues that we need to understand if we wish to 
grasp an intervention’s built-in selectivity. 
Each of the four boundary issues is then further structured into three boundary
categories, the first standing for a social group or  role (stakeholder), the second for a
role-specific concern (what’s at stake), and the third for a  key problem in reconciling
clashes between such concerns (a stakeholding issue). (The term ‘role’ is to remind
us that any one person or group of people may in a specific intervention hold several
roles, that is, role-specific concerns.) These 12 kinds of boundary judgements, or the
boundary categories to which they refer, signal what we must be looking for in order
to make a system meaningful and to validate or challenge the claims we associate
with it. Taken together, they define the selectivity of the reference system at work.
 Box 6.1 An unfolding narrative of CSH 
Notes:
 (a)  The example is for the purpose of ‘ideal mapping’, as explained in sections 
6.2.4.1 (on ‘Ideal Mapping’) and 6.2.5.1 (on ‘Developing CSH 
Literacy’). 
(b)  The numbers in brackets refer to CSH categories 1–12. 
Any human reference system might start with questions regarding some 
notion of ‘purpose’ in order to provide some initial sense of orientation. This 
then prompts the question regarding ‘whose purpose?’ An underpinning
purpose reflects embedded values associated with some person or persons 
(even if that someone is representing the intrinsic value of non-human 
nature). Identifying first the  ideal purpose (2) of the reference system in the 
‘ought’ mode therefore suggests who the intended beneficiaries should be 
(1). This in turn suggests what might be appropriate measures of success in 
securing some improvement (3). In other words, how might the underpinning 
values be given formal expression (quantifiably or qualitatively) – through 
evaluation – to gauge improvement? Such questions make transparent the 
value basis of the ideal system. 
Unfolding questions of motivation leads to questions regarding the necessary 
resources or components needed for success (5). Financial capital and other 
forms of tangible assets like natural, physical, and human capital might be 
complemented with less tangible factors such as social capital (access to 
networks of influence); but who is in control of such resources and might thus 
best be placed to provide them (4)? This in turn prompts questions as to what 
should be left outside the control of such decision makers in order to ensure 
some level of accountability. What  relevant factors having an important 
potential impact on the system ought to lie outside the system, lest all the 
parties concerned depend entirely on those in control? In other words, what 
(continued) 
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Box 6.1 (continued) 
should be part of the system’s decision environment (6) in order to keep it in 
check and accountable? What should be relevant but not component? So for 
example, if a system initiated with good intention becomes malignant, cor­
rupt or disabling because of changing circumstances, are there factors in the 
environment that might ensure that the system deemed appropriate for one 
context and time is prevented from continuing indefinitely? Such questions 
help to make transparent the  power-basis of the system. 
One such set of factors requiring independence from the decision maker is 
‘knowledge’ or expertise. That is, in an ideal setting human ‘capital’ 
(embodying expertise) ought not to be under the sole control of the decision 
maker but should have some independence. So what are the necessary types 
and levels of competent knowledge and experiential know-how (8) to ensure 
that the reference system actually has practical applicability and works 
towards its ideal purpose? Who ought to provide such expertise (7)? How 
might such expert support prove to be an effective guarantor; a provider of 
some assurance of success (9)? This invites the need to look out for false 
guarantors – that is, sources of deception. False guarantors are manifest by, 
for example, having expertise being incomplete and/or incompetent in terms 
of a specialised field, or more generally through assuming a dogmatic author­
ity and complacency (e.g. a technocratic viewpoint) that does not allow for 
inevitable uncertainties (unforeseen events and unexpected consequences) 
and/or for the validity of other viewpoints and perspectives. Such questions 
help to make transparent the  knowledge-basis of the system. 
Finally, given the inevitable bias regarding values (motivation), power (con­
trol) and even knowledge (expertise) associated with any reference system, 
what is the legitimacy of such a system within wider spheres of human inter­
ests? In other words, if the reference system is looked at from a different, 
opposing viewpoint, in what ways might the activities be considered as coer­
cive or malignant rather than emancipatory or benign (11)? Who (or what – 
for example non-human nature) hold such concerns, that is, who are the 
‘victims’ of the system – and, importantly, what type of representation ought 
to be made on their behalf? That is, who may regard themselves capable of 
making representations on the victims’ behalf and on what basis would they 
make this claim (10)? Finally, how might the underlying worldview associ­
ated with the reference system be reconciled with opposing worldviews (12)? 
Where might representation of opposing views be expressed, and what action 
ought to happen as a result? Such questions help to make transparent the 
reference system’s  basis of legitimacy , with special regard for the underpin­
ning worldviews and moral assumptions, in dealing with the concerns of third 
parties and with long-term social and ecological implications. 
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The narrative in Box 6.1 illustrates a gradually unfolding shift in emphasis and 
concern from core constituents of a system of interest to features of its environment. 
In this way an unfolding (or peeling back, as it were) of successive sources of influence 
enables us to step out of the immediate point of reference in order to see ‘the bigger 
picture’ – a first step in reflective practice. 
With Churchman, CSH operationalises this quest for the bigger picture as a 
dialogue (or in CSH terms, a reflective and discursive effort) among increasingly 
wider conceptualisations of the system of concern, as embodied in the three per­
spectives of  goal planning, objective-planning, and ideal planning (see Churchman 
1979 , p. 82f; Ulrich  1983 , p. 263 and  1988b , pp. 425–427). However, in line with 
its different understanding of the process of unfolding, the focus in CSH shifts from 
Churchman’s quest for holistic thinking – for expanding system boundaries ever 
more – to the critical purpose of uncovering the unavoidable selectivity of our 
claims, whatever the underlying boundary judgements may be. This new focus on 
boundary critique rather than boundary expansion developed from the author’s 
experience as a policy analyst: 
My personal conclusion is that dealing rationally with the problem of boundary judgements
depends not so much on a never-ending sweep-in process – a heroic enterprise – but on a
conscious and critical employment of bvoundary judgements.  Not what our boundary judge­
ments are but how we treat them will determine the quality of our systems thinking in the first
place. For example, do we as policy analysts hide disputable boundary judgements ... behind
a façade of expertise or do we really seek to make them transparent to everybody concerned?
Any other conclusion would imply that the best systems thinker is the one who deals with the
biggest problems. I think, rather, that the best systems thinker is the one who deals most
consciously and overtly with the way in which s/he bounds the problem. (Ulrich  1988b , 
p. 420, slightly edited)
That is, unfolding in CSH is about value clarification rather than a hopeless 
(because never-ending) quest for comprehensiveness. The search for a whole-systems 
view of problems, while all right as an ideal, does not free us from the need to reflect 
on the selectivity of whatever standpoint we assume for grasping and assessing a 
situation as comprehensively as possible. But we cannot properly appreciate our 
standpoint without first gaining some critical distance – which is what the process 
of unfolding selectivity is all about.
6.2.3.2  Questioning Boundary Judgements 
In CSH the process of questioning boundary judgements is crucial, and it is to this 
second level of boundary critique that we can now turn. Boundary questioning 
consists in analysing, evaluating and challenging the rightness of boundary assumptions; 
in one word: in testing rather than settling them, which would mean to fix them and 
thereby to turn them into ‘givens’ or even to withdraw them from any further critical 
discussion. Obviously, boundary questioning presupposes some previous aware­
ness and unfolding of boundary judgements; which is to say, the distinction between 
boundary unfolding and questioning is an analytic one rather than a practical one. 
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In practice, unfolding and questioning boundaries inform and support one another 
in a closely interrelated way.
The basic idea is this. When it comes to boundary judgements, no one can claim 
to have the single right answers; therein consists the basic problem raised by the 
unavoidability of boundary judgements. The only practical approach is to examine 
the different selectivity of  alternative proposals, as a basis for well-informed and 
transparent processes of opinion forming and decision making within democrati­
cally legitimate institutional settings. This is why CSH gives priority to  boundary 
questioning (also referred to as ‘boundary testing’ in some sources) rather than to 
an illusory attempt to overcome selectivity through some kind of ‘whole-systems’ 
perspective. 
Once we have found tentative responses to the ‘is’ and ‘ought’ boundary ques­
tions through the process of unfolding, the next task consists in questioning their 
validity. How can we be confident that the boundary judgements in question are 
right? What alternatives might be found more adequate? How would we want to 
defend them if challenged to do so? This sort of questions requires us to identify 
the exact nature and scope of the claims to which the boundary judgements give rise 
– for example, what is claimed to be achieved and who is supposed to benefit, and 
how can this choice be justified rationally? – and to submit these claims to the 
critique of the different parties concerned. Ultimately, since there are no objectively 
right or wrong answers to such questions, only legitimate processes of decision­
making informed by such critique can achieve this. Not unlike a good map, a good 
process of decision-making should make transparent the boundary judgements on 
which the claims to be decided upon rely, and should also shed light on how differ­
ent these claims may look in the light of alternative boundary judgements. In short, 
when we subject a claim to ‘boundary questioning’, we examine its consequences 
in the light of alternative sets of boundary judgements (those it assumes as well as 
options). 
To be sure, clarifying consequences may require careful inquiry, at times with 
professional support. However, this is not to reserve boundary questioning to a setting 
in which professional expertise is available. We are dealing with an in-principle 
requirement rather than an absolute necessity. Where consequences are reasonably 
clear, say in everyday situations in which those involved oversee the implications 
of their propositions, it may be perfectly feasible to question boundary assumptions 
on the basis of knowledge available to everyone. For example, knowing something 
about the possible climate effects of fuel consumption may be sufficient to change 
our views about what ‘improvement’ means in the design of traffic policies, so we 
will revise our measure of improvement (CSHq3). Revision of boundary assump­
tions takes place quite naturally in everyday life as soon as our attention is drawn 
to previously neglected circumstances that in some way matter to us. We practice 
boundary critique every day without being aware of it! The difference is only that 
we do not practice it consciously and systematically. Once we become aware of the 
basic idea, we will be able to question boundary judgements so much more effec­
tively, both in individual reflection and in dialogue with others: 
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 1. Boundary reﬂ ection: Do my/our/their current ‘is’ boundary judgements agree with
my/our/their ‘ought’ boundary judgements? That is, is there a discrepancy between
what I/we have identiﬁed as my/our/their actual boundary judgements on the one
hand and what we would consider adequate, if not ideal, boundary judgements on
the other hand? If so, should I/we revise my/our boundary assumptions?
 2. Boundary discourse: Do my/our boundary judgements conﬂ ict with yours? If so,
may this help us understand why we disagree about what is the problem or what to
do about it? Can we revise our boundary judgements so that we then agree about 
the issues, although perhaps still not about solutions? (cf. Ulrich 2000 , p. 255)
The first mode of boundary questioning aims at handling boundary judgements
self-critically, the second at using them dialogically so as to improve mutual
understanding and, where necessary, to challenge those who may not handle their
boundary judgements so self-critically. (It should again be clear that these two
modes of boundary questioning are closely interrelated and support each other,
and that a similar distinction applies to the boundary unfolding that is presup­
posed in boundary questioning.) Figures 6.4 and 6.5 illustrate the two modes of
boundary questioning.
Consequences: 
a reflected 
assessment of 
a claim 
boundary 
reflection 
Reference system: 
“ 
” 
How does this claim look in the light of the context that matters to 
me or which I assume to matter to others; what consequences do 
I see and how do I assess them?
 Fig. 6.4 Boundary reflection: first of two complementary forms of boundary questioning. 
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a debated 
multiplicity of 
options for 
assessing and 
modifying a claim 
Systematic 
boundary 
discourse 
Multiple reference systems: 
“different contexts that matter 
to you and me/us/them” 
How does this claim look in the light of the different contexts that 
matter to you and me; what different consequences do we see and 
how differently do we assess them?
 Fig. 6.5  Boundary discourse: second complementary form of boundary questioning 
Through both boundary reflection and boundary discourse, we can make our­
selves and everyone else concerned aware of the ways in which all proposals and 
claims are conditioned by boundary judgements, and can on this basis begin to be 
more open to alternative proposals and appreciate the reasoning behind them. Once 
it becomes apparent that there are options for the boundary assumptions in ques­
tion, it is no longer necessary and meaningful for anyone to claim objectivity for 
their specific reference systems; we can gain a new level of mutual understanding 
and tolerance in dealing with the often conflictual nature of interventions. Through 
boundary reflection, we can achieve a new quality of professional self-reflection; 
through boundary discourse, a new quality of communication in and about profes­
sional interventions. 
The two case studies, to which we now turn, exemplify both modes of boundary 
critique, the quest for professional self-reflection as well as for improved
communication. They also address both levels of boundary critique, unfolding
and questioning. Combining the two distinctions, the NRUA-Botswana study
exemplifies mainly a reflective mode of boundary unfolding, whereas the
ECOSENSUS-Guyana study exemplifies more a discursive mode of boundary
questioning.
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 6.2.4  Boundary Critique Applied to NRUA-Botswana 
The Botswana study (for a full account, see Reynolds  1998) aimed to evaluate three 
projects that were all concerned with participatory planning in rural development: 
–	 Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) Pilot Project
–	 Natural Resource Management Project (NRMP)
–	 Botswana Range Inventory and Monitoring Project (BRIMP)
Each project was considered as an effort to design a system of interest that could 
meaningfully be examined in the terms of boundary critique, by identifying and 
unfolding its major sources of influence: 
–	 Motivation: the prime stated objectives were centred on promoting participatory 
planning 
–	 Control: along with government, donor agencies provided significant resources 
(finance, infrastructure etc).
–	 Knowledge: significant expertise came from non-governmental sources (such as 
NGOs, private consultants and parastatal organisations)
–	 Legitimacy: the prime stated objectives were more aligned with social and envi­
ronmental improvement rather than conventional drivers of economic
improvement 
The basis for evaluating the projects was to be furnished by field research; its 
results were then to be assessed against the researcher’s own ideal reference system. 
Accordingly, the evaluation started with an effort by the author ( qua evaluator) to 
map out both an ‘ideal map’ and an ‘actual map’ of the situation he encountered in 
Botswana. Not unlike the way Ulrich had used these two kinds of maps in the two 
case studies that are included in Critical Heuristics (1983 , Chapters 8 and 9), the 
ideal (or normative) map was to clarify the evaluator’s ‘ought’ reference system 
whereas the actual (or descriptive) map was to identify major boundary judgements 
built into the current situation. Our account therefore starts with ideal mapping. 
6.2.4.1  Ideal Mapping (Identifying the ‘Ought’) 
As a first step, the evaluator reflected on his personal reference system for evaluating 
natural resource-use appraisal (NRUA) and participatory planning for rural development 
in Botswana. Wherein consisted his preconception (or perhaps bias) as to what such 
planning was all about? How  should he understand the relevant context, and thus 
the reference system of his evaluative endeavour? Based mainly on preparatory 
background reading, as well as some previous personal familiarity with the situa­
tion in Botswana, he tentatively defined his reference system as follows:  ‘a system 
to enhance natural resource-use appraisal (NRUA) through participatory planning 
for assisting rural poverty alleviation and protection of the natural environment in 
Botswana’. 
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Next, a reflective exercise of ideal mapping was to clarify the normative orientation 
to be associated with this reference system for the purpose of the evaluation. 
Obviously, this normative orientation might later change, but an evaluation has to 
start with some normative assumptions and these should be clear from the start. 
Table  6.2 illustrates the result of this ideal mapping exercise, constructed by 
means of the 12 boundary categories of CSH; the categories were unfolded following 
the sequence recommended in Fig. 6.2 .
In an ideal world of purposeful human activity, the roles of beneficiary, decision
maker, expert and witness are closely interrelated and ultimately converge (Ulrich  1996 ,
p. 40f). For natural resource-use appraisal, a system of self-organisation and appraisal
involving conscientious natural resource users (sharing communal land) might be con­
sidered as such an ideal situation. The point is not that we should assume we live in an
ideal world; the point is that ideal mapping provides us with critical distance to what is
real. With this aim in mind, the ideal map summarised in Table  6.2 provided a helpful
point of reference for subsequently constructing and questioning descriptive maps 
(or ‘actual maps’, in the terms of CSH) of each of the three projects.
 6.2.4.2  Descriptive Mapping (The ‘Is’ Analyses) 
The descriptive mapping in the NRUA study occurred in two stages: firstly, it was 
to identify the relevant stakeholder groups for each project; and secondly, it was to 
specify the role-concerns of all identified stakeholders and surface key problems in 
reconciling these concerns.
 Stage 1: Identifying Stakeholder Groups 
It was found that in all three projects, the social roles of beneficiary, decision maker, 
expert and witness were largely played out by four main kinds of institutional agents. 
These were, respectively, government departments, donor agencies, consultants, and 
non-government organisations (see Table  6.3 ). Whilst impoverished natural resource 
users would clearly represent the  ultimate intended (or ’ideal’) beneficiaries (see 
Table  6.2 ), for the purpose of identifying  actual stakeholders associated with each 
project there was a need to address and interview the  immediate beneficiaries of 
NRUA – the various government departments who would claim to be working on 
behalf of the rural poor. During the later evaluation, the author kept in check and 
made transparent in fieldwork notes the assumptions (a) that government authorities 
would indeed ensure appropriate representation of such stakeholders and (b), to the 
extent they would fail to do so, that NGOs would provide such representation.
The primary roles and role-related concerns assigned to the four major institu­
tional agents are not to be understood as being mutually exclusive. While there 
was considerable overlap among the stakeholders’ concerns, it was useful to have
this first mapping of stakeholders as a basis for starting a more detailed evaluation 
of NRUA associated with each project.
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Table 6.2 Ideal map of participatory natural resource-use appraisal in Botswana 
Sources of 
influence 
Social roles 
(Stakeholders) 
Role-specific concerns 
(Stakes) 
Key problems 
(Stakeholding issues) 
Motivation Beneficiary
Rural poor, future  
generations and 
non-human nature 
Purpose 
To improve natural  
resource use planning 
in addressing needs 
of the vulnerable 
Measure of improvement 
Indices of 
(i) Rural poverty 
alleviation 
(ii) Enhanced condition 
of natural resources 
Control Decision-maker Resources Decision environment 
Communal resource 
users 
Necessary components 
to enable NRUA, 
including: 
(i) Project/ finance/human 
(ii) Social networks 
(i) Interest groups affected 
by NRUA 
(ii) Expertise not be-holden 
to decision maker 
Expertise Expert
Communal resource 
users informed by 
natural and social 
scientists and other 
sources of relevant 
knowledge and  
experience 
Expertise 
Technical/experiential/ 
social knowledge 
and skills, including 
(i) Rural peoples’ 
knowledge and experience 
(ii) Interdisciplinary 
and intersectoral 
facilitation skills 
(iii) Social and environ­
mental responsibility 
Guarantor 
Competent professional 
and non-professional 
knowledge, avoiding: 
(i) ‘Scientism’ (sole 
reliance on objective
and statistical ‘fact’) 
(ii) ‘Managerialism’ (sole 
reliance on facilitating 
communication) 
(iii) ‘Populism’ (allowing 
loudest collective voice as 
sole guarantor) 
Legitimation Witness 
Collective citizenry 
representing interests 
of all (including 
pri vate sector) 
affected by NRUA, 
both local and global, 
and present and 
future generations 
Emancipation 
NRUA open to 
challenge from 
those adversely affected, 
including interests of 
private land owners 
and diamond industry 
competing for access to 
communal resources 
Worldview
Manage conflicts of 
interest between: 
(i) National economic 
growth, privatization and 
fencing policies 
(ii) Vulnerable rural 
livelihoods and nature 
Stage 2: Eliciting Concerns and Key Problems in Each System of Interest 
The crux of the study then consisted in identifying precise stakeholder representa­
tives from each of the four institutional agents for each of the three projects, and 
eliciting from these representatives information on the concerns and key problems 
they associated with participatory NRUA practice, and perhaps also with participatory 
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 Table 6.3 Actual stakeholder map of natural resource-use appraisal in Botswana in the 1990s
Major stakeholders (primary 
roles of the institutional Major stakeholder roles (primary concerns 
agents identified) of the institutional agents identified) 
Government departments 	 Beneficiary: getting chances to participate in improved 
NRUA practice for better delivery on, and design of, 
government policy, on behalf of rural constituency 
Donor agency 	 Decision maker: providing resources efficiently for effective
NRUA practice 
 Consultancy (academic Expert (professional): ensuring impartial production of
or private business) knowledge for sustainable and ethical natural resource use
 Non-government organisations Witness: representing interests of impoverished natural 
(NGOs) resource users, future generations, and non-human nature 
planning in Botswana in general. The fieldwork of gathering this information occu­
pied the most time in the study and correspondingly generated the most data. There 
is no need (nor space) here to go through the descriptive maps assembled for each 
of the three projects. Neither is there space for detailing the process of critiquing 
each descriptive map against the corresponding/respective ideal map of NRUA. 
More important is that readers get a feel for the outputs of this systematic boundary 
critique. 
6.2.4.3  Critique: ‘Ought’ and ‘Is’ 
Boxes 6.2–6.4 provide brief summaries of the final critique resulting for each project 
which was presented in more detailed form to the project personnel. Each Box 
summarises some descriptive mapping and specific critique of ‘role’, ‘role-specific 
concern’ and ‘key problems’ associated with each source of influence. 
It may appear that the critiques presented for each project are very negative. 
The summaries provided here do not give justice to the creative aspects of each 
project which were also detailed in the reports to project personnel. Nevertheless a 
central task of CSH is to nurture an attitude of creative disruption. From a critical 
systems perspective critique does not equate to being negative, but rather should 
provide a platform for  improving understanding and practice associated with a 
situation of interest or a context that matters.
6.2.4.4  Extra-discursive and Discursive Evaluation 
The NRUA-Botswana study represents an example of systematic boundary critique
adopting a largely extra-discursive, ‘expert-driven’ use of CSH categories. In other words,
the use of CSH categories was reserved for the author’s own purposes. For example,
interview schedules were designed around CSH questions; not organised in terms of
systematically going through each CSH question but rather customised according to
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 Box 6.2 Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) Pilot Project 
 Motivation 
critique
Control 
critique
Expertise 
critique
 Legitimacy 
critique
Local government  extension officers were immediate 
beneficiaries rewarded with facilitation skills to enable 
greater involvement of local people in extension 
work. But to what extent might  alleviating perceived 
rural social inertia lead to poverty alleviation? The 
key measure of success for the project was centred on 
high levels of participation and generation of self-help 
projects. Perhaps instead, rural poor might benefit 
from better access to and control over resources 
rather than being subject to further consolidation of 
government extension practices. 
Under trajectory of (i) increased privatisation and 
fencing of communal land resulting in further alienation 
of natural resource, and (ii) reduced government 
assistance for local development projects, rural poor 
livelihoods are increasingly dependent on contracts 
with landowners and donor support for collective
projects. Is there a risk that rural people’s knowledge 
loses its independence in becoming increasingly
subject to government extension practice which itself 
is circumscribed by government central policy? 
To what extent might participation levels amongst rural 
poor in PRA exercises provide a guarantee for poverty 
alleviation? Might this guarantor attribute distract from 
large body of empirical data and experience suggesting 
significant correlation between rural poverty and land 
fencing policy since the mid-1970s? 
Dominant underpinning belief that benevolent
government (through tradition of generous handouts and 
transfer of technology projects) has been responsible 
for generating rural social inertia, hence the need for 
government to step back and allow ‘development from 
within’. Danger of further marginalising rural poor 
through not appreciating perceived root cause relating 
to control and access to land. 
(i) the perceived stakeholder role (beneficiary, decision maker etc.), (ii) the particular
project being focused upon (often, interviewees would have a stake in several projects
at the same time), and (iii) information arising from prior interviews with other 
stakeholders and/or relevant grey literature. During the course of this study three separate
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 Box 6.3 Natural Resource Management Project (NRMP) 
 Motivation 
critique
Control 
critique
Expertise 
critique
 Legitimacy 
critique
Key beneficiaries of NRMP appear to be management
staff of community based natural resource management
(CBNRM) projects responsible for eliciting support/ 
resources from different line Ministries (e.g. Wildlife and
Tourism, Agriculture, Water Affairs, Local Government).
But to what extent might improved  multisectoral planning
address rural poverty and communal land degradation?
Key measure of success is the number of CBNRM projects,
primarily as indices of improved intersectoral collaboration.
But do CBNRM projects (i) use or simply bypass line
ministries? (ii) elicit collaboration with government or
dependency on donors? and (iii) serve the  very poor?
Have CBNRM projects become new currency for
rural development? Whilst CBNRM might appear to 
be better grounded in local needs, are there greater 
levels of accountability in use of financial resources 
as compared with government extension programmes? 
Does short term funding support from donor agencies 
allow government to divert resource support away from 
local rural development? 
CBNRM management requires multidisciplinary exper­
tise and skills in facilitation. But to what extent are 
participatory techniques involving rural participants
a useful trigger for intersectoral collaboration and
communication between traditional sector and dis­
ciplinary based experts? Rural people’s knowledge may 
be regarded as a useful check on professional judge­
ments but how far is it appreciated as a potential driver 
for rural development initiatives? 
Dominant underpinning belief that appropriate expertise 
ought to drive rural development rather than traditional 
dependence on civil service sector-based bureaucratic 
functions that inevitably create the closed ‘silo’ mentality. 
Possible conflict with local understandings of the need 
for greater autonomy and control over development 
amongst rural participants in conjunction with locally­
elected government officials rather than donor-promoted 
project managers. 
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Box 6.4 Botswana Range Inventory and Monitoring Project (BRIMP)
 Motivation 
critique
Control 
critique
Expertise 
critique
 Legitimacy 
critique
Immediate beneficiaries are  policy advisors wishing to instil 
longer-term coordinated planning to address problems of 
previous piecemeal development in rural sector. BRIMP
is housed in the Ministry of Agriculture, dominated by 
free market neo-liberal economic development planning and 
policies associated with fencing communal rangeland. So 
how likely is it that such coordinated planning might benefit 
rural poor? Do economic measures of success associated with 
gross national (agricultural) product equate with rural poverty 
alleviation and enhanced condition of natural environment? 
Commoditised resources provide the most appropriate means for 
economic planning. Thus fencing of communal land, privatising 
water supply, project-oriented development, and having rural 
participants on-tap for consultations during monitoring and 
evaluation efforts, might be considered as important measures 
of control; consolidating existing relations of economic power 
rather than empowering the rural communities (?). Are there 
risks of further disenfranchising rural communities through 
consolidating private ownership of land? 
Central guarantee for ensuring properly co-ordinated efforts is 
through purposive monitoring and evaluation using econometric 
indices based on criteria of efficiency and effectiveness in 
terms of generating economic wealth from natural resources. 
Participatory techniques using rural people’s knowledge are 
regarded as a means of (in PRA terms) ‘ground-truthing’ or 
checking information arising from more technically oriented 
surveillance systems like remote sensing. 
Dominant belief that free-market determinism using
econometric devices applied to natural resource-use provide 
most effective means for reducing poverty and protecting the 
natural environment. Needs reconciling with the Botswana 
tradition in communal rangeland management, and primacy of 
democratic debate as a means of determining policy.
learning journals were kept – one for each of the NRUA projects being evaluated. The
material in each of the three journals provided an essential resource for writing up an ‘is’
analysis (descriptive map) of each project. The ensuing critique was generated largely
from individual reflection on the data gathered and experiences gained.
But the real value of boundary critique lies in its dialogical use to test other 
stakeholders’ reference systems. Despite the methodological conception of the 
evaluation study itself as an extra-discursive intervention, in the sense that CSH 
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was employed in a monological (problem-structuring and practice-reflecting) way,
that is, as a tool of post-hoc boundary reflection, an important dialogical component 
came into play though the process of sharing the findings with the project person­
nel. This was done, firstly, through formal interviewing; secondly, through informal 
engagement amongst stakeholders involved with actual PRA activities; and thirdly, 
through the interim reporting stage where feedback from stakeholders was sought. 
How did CSH inform the interviews with 78 stakeholders associated with the three
projects? Each interview began with questions relating to what the stakeholders con­
sidered to be their main role, their main concerns and key problems in fulfilling their
role. Wider questions were then asked about relationships with other stakeholders and
their perceived roles, concerns and key problems. These responses were mapped in
the form of initial ideal (‘ought’) and actual (‘is’) maps, which then provided further
prompts in developing the conversation throught further interviews. Conflicts coming
to the fore among respondents belonging to same stakeholder group were recorded
and used for further enquiry and/or included in interim reports. Some of the intervie­
wees were further interviewed less formally during subsequent fieldwork.
In recording all these conversations, it proved useful to continually update the 
respondents’ ideal and actual maps. The mapping of stakeholder views was found to 
be a continually evolving exercise during conversations and accompanying reading 
of informal grey literature made available through the conversations. At the same 
time, critiques were emerging which equally needed continual recording. Again, this 
was essentially a subjective exercise on the part of the evaluator, although other ways 
of handling the critical process are of course conceivable, for example, making it a 
central concern of some (moderated) groups of stakeholders. In any case, it was 
important to keep a record of the developing critique as a basis for reporting back. 
Reporting back on a CSH-based evaluation clearly involves transparency.
As well as revealing contrasting values, power-relations, expert-biases, and ques­
tions regarding the wider legitimacy of NRUA practice, the evaluation also invoked 
the transparency of the evaluator regarding the reference system that informed the 
evaluation. Skills in translating findings and impressions into a mutually appreci­
ated vocabulary and narrative were equally required, remembering that stakeholders 
are not conversant with CSH terminology. A key to successful evaluation lies in 
eliciting critical appreciation and further engagement among stakeholders. All 
stakeholders were invited to comment on the interim reports either orally or in writing, 
which generated considerable feedback. Finally, a specially convened seminar at 
the University of Botswana provided further opportunity for dialogue among more 
than 50 participants from all three projects. 
Each report began with an explicit statement of (i) what the author’s perception 
was on the main issues of the evaluation, including underlying values and pur­
poses of the project, issues of power and decision making, relevant knowledge, 
and moral underpinnings; and (ii) the author’s own role and purpose with respect 
to the evaluation exercise. Respondents should be made aware that scientific data 
and statistics, while useful to support the output of a CSH evaluation, provided 
only one element in the overall evaluation; its core was a qualitative exercise 
primarily aimed towards collaborative improvement of, and developing responsibility 
over, the situation.
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 6.2.5  Boundary Critique Applied to ECOSENSUS-Guyana2 
In the ECOSENSUS study, the discursive mode of boundary critique moved into 
the centre. Whereas in Botswana CSH served as a framework for evaluating the use 
of participatory planning, in Guyana it was to serve as a framework for engaging 
underprivileged stakeholders along with researchers and planners in participatory 
processes of decision making, by giving them a new language for articulating their 
concerns. To put it differently: whereas the Botswana study used boundary critique 
directly to formulate reference systems for evaluative research, ECOSENSUS 
wanted to make a start towards generating  CSH literacy among stakeholders. It 
should be said though that this was not the main aim of the project; it primarily was 
a pilot study for developing and testing new software tools to support participatory 
planning and management of natural resource use among geographically distributed 
stakeholders and professionals. The connection between the two aims was the idea 
that the software tools might incorporate concepts of boundary discourse, so as to 
encourage and facilitate a critical handling of stakeholding issues. 
The stakeholders involved included Makushi Amerindians and their NGO
representatives in the Rupununi wetlands; planners and other experts in the field of 
environmental management and computational software development; University 
of Guyana postgraduate students, and project funders. 
Given that the project was conceived as an exploratory pilot study, its financial 
and time frame were rather limited and its level of ambition was accordingly modest. 
Within this frame, ECOSENSUS had two specific objectives: 
1. To help develop open-source software tools that should enable marginalised 
communities to engage with partners and experts elsewhere in shared, Internet 
supported processes of decision making about environmental issues
2. To develop open content learning units able to support the use of the software 
tools developed in the project, thereby also promoting collaborative skills in 
managing natural resource dilemmas. 
With a view to the first objective, the technical basis was provided by  uDig, an open­
source graphic surface for geographical information systems (GIS) – from where 
comes the name ‘uDig’ (= user-friendly Desktop/Internet GIS, see http://udig.refrac­
tions.net/). A second technical basis consisted in  Compendium, an open-source 
software for dialogue mapping developed at the Open University on the basis of 
Kunz and Rittel’s (1970) concept of issue-based information systems (IBIS), (see 
Conklin 2005 and http://projects.kmi.open.ac.uk/compendium/). ECOSENSUS 
should achieve an integration of Compendium with uDig, so as to facilitate their 
simultaneous use. At the same time, the project should explore possibilities to extend 
Compendium with mapping tools developed on the basis of CSH, so as to help users 
unfold the vital stakeholding issues involved in the aim of supporting marginalised 
2 We are indebted to colleagues working with us on the ECOSENSUS project for some of the ideas 
expressed in this chapter. ECOSENSUS was supported by the United Kingdom’s Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC), Project Reference Number RES-149-25-1017. 
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communities. Finally, the project should pilot-test whether such software applica­
tions would indeed enable the stakeholders to adopt a wider problem perspective and 
unfold it in a well-structured, graphically supported, manner. 
With a view to the second objective, the project began developing and testing a 
pilot online course with participants from Guyana, as an opportunity for them to 
develop some initial practice in using the software tools as well as in boundary 
discourse. The course was provisionally entitled  Team Building for Sustainable 
Natural Resource Management. The participants included NGO representatives of 
the Amerindian community and students at the University of Guyana, two staff 
members from the University of Guyana acted as tutors. The authors were part of 
a wider course development team with colleagues from the Open University, the 
University of London and the University of Guyana. 
The project thus comprised a number of interrelated endeavours which, though 
often running concurrently and being very iterative, may nevertheless be laid out in 
rough chronological order: 
1. Initial team building and familiarisation with existing software tools (uDig, 
Compendium, video conferencing software) and systems ideas (CSH) among 
distributed team members
2. Technical integration of uDig with Compendium and testing with the team
3.  Development of CSH templates for Compendium 
4.  Empirical testing of CSH templates in Guyana 
5. Development and testing of open content learning material for team building
For the present purpose we need not concern ourselves with the technical side of 
the project (which progressed satisfactorily) but can focus on endeavours 3 and 4. 
We can also briefly explore the intent and challenges behind using CSH as an input 
to building open educational resources (OERs) for the wider purpose of team build­
ing (endeavour 5). 
6.2.5.1  Developing CSH Literacy 
Since in Guyana CSH was to serve mainly as a discursive framework for mediating 
conversation, language issues became central. While in Botswana the evaluator was 
reasonably familiar with the language of CSH, in ECOSENSUS the intended users 
were new to boundary critique. It was necessary to ‘translate’ CSH in two respects –
firstly, into short expressions that could easily be captured in the graphic surface of 
uDig and Compendium, and secondly, into terms accessible to a marginalised non-
European community accustomed more to verbal and visual communication than 
to written literacy. Other studies have equally reported on the importance of adapt­
ing the tools of boundary critique to specific users groups; compare, for example, 
Carr and Oreszczyn (2003) and Achterkamp and Vos (2007) . 
In promoting CSH literacy among specific users, an immediate question arises:
Why might they wish to engage in boundary conversation? We found it useful to ‘pick
up’ our intended users by responding to specific motives they might have for engag­
ing in boundary reflection and discourse. We thus developed  four basic templates for
boundary critique, each relating to a particular motive or purpose (see Box 6.5).
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Box 6.5 Templates for four basic applications of boundary critique 
(Adapted from Ulrich 2005, p. 12) 
Template (a): Ideal Mapping 
Purpose: ‘Vision building’ 
Guiding question: ’What’s our vision?’ 
(or: Where do we want to go from here?) 
Template (b): Evaluation 
Purpose: ‘Value clariﬁ cation’ 
Guiding question: ’Where are we standing?’ 
(or: How satisﬁed are we with the state of affairs?) 
Template (c): Reframing 
Purpose: ‘Boundary revision’ 
Guiding question: ’What’s the relevant context?’ 
(or: How else can we frame the picture?) 
Template (d): Challenge 
Purpose: ‘Emancipation’ 
Guiding question: ’Don’t you claim too much?’ 
(or: How can we rationally claim this is right?) 
Once stakeholders can see a purpose behind the use of a particular language tool, 
the motivation to engage increases. Moreover, the templates offer some direction 
for training and practice, in that they stand for increasingly demanding uses of 
boundary critique. They thus also represent levels of increasing competence in 
boundary reflection and discourse. The first two templates (a) and (b) represent an 
elementary use of boundary questions – in the ‘ought’ mode for (a) and in both the 
‘ought’ and ‘is’ modes for (b) – which we have found easiest to learn for most users 
of CSH. The third template – (c) reframing – additionally involves a critique of 
‘ought’ and ‘is’, with the aim of providing an alternative reference system (i.e. 
another set of answers to the boundary questions). Template (d), finally, represents 
a more advanced, argumentative use of boun dary critique, where any one of the 
responses to a question might be countered by, say: 
• 	 A suggestion: e.g. “I see young people as beneficiaries but I don’t see them included
at present”
• 	 A doubt: e.g. “I wonder about the assumed assurances of success, what if you 
ignore…?” 
• 	 A contradiction: e.g. “if this is the client, we will not accomplish the right thing, 
because…” or finally
• 	 A simple what-if inquiry: e.g. “what if we would redefine expertise as…?”
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So much for the basic issue of providing impetus for boundary reflection and dis­
course. The next issue was testing how the intended users understood the boundary
questions. In a field test with participants in Guyana, we first found considerable vari­
ability in their understanding of the questions. But when we subsequently applied the
questions more specifically to one of the four purposes (a)–(d) mentioned above,
rather than simply testing CSH’s language without a clear end in mind, there was
more appreciation and comprehension. Box 6.6 illustrates some responses of 18
Box 6.6 Getting familiar with CSH questions 
(Selected responses from 18 participants of the ECOSENSUS-Guyana 
study to boundary questions relating to land-use planning for the North 
Rupununi wetlands) 
Responses to questions about motivation (CSHq1–3)
“There shouldn’t be one client in all of this. There should be a sort of a continuum
where ‘clients’ are of different [and] varying levels of importance, and the
dependency on the Rupununi should be the tool that identifies these levels.
For example, a villager in the Rupununi seeking economic gain, so that he
can send his children to school, should be able to use the [natural] resources
in the area to do this.”
“The researchers ought to be the client because they are the ones who 
provide information [for] the both local communities and the world – the 
purpose is for people to have knowledge of the project, their objective and 
purpose.” 
“National institutions in terms of meeting their CBD [community based 
development] [with] objectives having more information for decision­
making – information is power” 
“It should serve everyone’s interest, even though this project involves few groups
of people, e.g. the communities, field staff, [and] scientists but in the long term
the purpose is for everyone. So it should serve everyone’s purpose.”
Responses to questions about control (CSHq4–6)
“The decision makers now are project managers, and to some extent field
researchers. For example, with the water chemistry kit being broken, the data
on water quality is not being collected.”
“Project coordinators, researchers the people living in the communities must 
work to make decisions.” 
“The immediate clients working with the wetlands project [ought to be 
decision makers]” 
“The North Rupununi District Development Board ought to be the decision 
maker.”
(continued) 
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Responses to questions about expertise (CSHq7–9)
“Those who ought to be considered [as] professional [are] communities of 
the north Rupununi [and] field researchers.” 
“Expertise of research, planning, consulting” 
“Everyone’s expertise [should] be consulted because everyone’s knowledge [should
be] considered. The project would [then] have a better impact to everyone and
this would be a better understanding among different groups of people.”
“[The actual source of expertise comes from] Conservation International, 
Guyana Foundation.” 
Responses to questions about legitimacy (CSHq10–12)
“One of the things that is affecting how stakeholders [feel] is that they buy into
what the project is about but their vision may be different from the people that
conceptualised it.”
“Having everyone involve to understand [how] to manage what is there for 
everyone’s benefit.” 
“The worldview that is determining is … land as sustainable wetlands area.” 
“Sustainable development is possible.” 
“Viewing the scientific knowledge is important. Use of scientific data is the 
professional thing to [do] in decision making.”
Box 6.6 (continued) 
respondents who were asked to try and use the questions as a help to voice their con­
cerns about current land-use development plans for the North Rupununi wetlands.
Not all 18 respondents were equally articulate. English was a second language 
for most and cultural differences made some questions more challenging than others 
to them. The questions on legitimacy for example recorded a relatively low 
response – a difficulty to be expected as questions of legitimacy are not easily 
raised in the Amerindian culture (legitimacy resides with the authority of the village 
elders). Despite such obstacles, there was evidence among the responses that with 
appropriate facilitation, meaningful stakeholder dialogue might develop. 
Turning now to the four purposes (a)–(d) mentioned above, it proved easiest to 
achieve a basic degree of CSH literacy in having the Amerindian participants talk 
about their visions for the future of the Rupununi wetland (‘ideal mapping’ as an 
entry-level use of boundary discourse, as suggested in Box 6.6 above). 
But how should we structure templates for ideal mapping and the other purposes 
specifically for stakeholders accustomed to oral and visual rather than written com­
munication? Clearly, the templates needed to use terms that would help the 
Amerindian participants relate the boundary questions directly to their experience; 
as well as provide a basis for visualising the sequence of unfolding suggested ear­
lier (Fig. 6.3 ) within the Compendium software. As a basis for formulating such 
templates we used the kind of decision (or deliberation) trees reproduced in 
Table  6.4 (the example shows a tree for an ideal-mapping template).
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 Table 6.4  Speciﬁcation of CSH questions for an ideal-mapping template (“What’s our vision?”)
 Boundary 
issues 
 Root issues  Main questions  Specified prompts 
a
tio
n 
What are the 
motivating 
factors? 
Whom do we want to serve? Primary clients? 
 Secondary clients? 
Whom can’t we realistically serve
although ideally we would?
 
o
f m
ot
iv What do we want to achieve? Primary aims? 
 Secondary aims? 
 Unrealistic aims? 
So
ur
ce
s
What should be our measure 
of improvement? 
Quantitative measure(s) of 
improvement? 
Qualitative aspects of 
improvement? 
 Who’s in 
control? 
Whom do we want to decide? Those able to stop us 
Those able to change or redefine 
our measures of improvement 
Those already in control of resources
o
l
n
tr What resources do we aim to Financial 
co have available? Material 
So
ur
ce
s 
o
f Political/social 
Other 
What conditions of success Public sector authorities 
should rightly be controlled 
by third parties? 
Private sector organisations 
Individual stakeholders not 
involved 
Nature/chance 
w
le
dg
e 
What 
information 
and skills are 
relevant? 
Whom do we want to 
contribute their experience 
and expertise? 
 Indispensable experts 
 Desirable experts 
 Impossible experts 
 Undesirable experts 
f k
no What information and 
skills do we want them to 
 Ordinary experience 
 Professional know-how 
So
ur
ce
s 
o contribute?  Professional skills 
Other 
Where should we look for 
some guarantee of success? 
 True guarantors 
 False guarantors 
 Doubtful/potential guarantors 
What Whom do we want to voice Those affected but not involved 
stakeholders 
should be 
the concerns of those not 
involved? 
Those concerned but not directly 
affected y
le
gi
tim
ac considered? Those normally without voice 
(future generations, 
non-human nature etc.) 
o
u
rc
es
 o
f What do we want to do to 
emancipate stakeholders from 
our premises and promises? 
In terms of rights 
In terms of compensation 
Other 
S What worldview do we want 
to rely on/privilege? 
 Privileged view 
 Clashing views 
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The template-trees were then translated into the Compendium dialogue mapping 
software. Answers, questions or conjectures arising in a conversation can be noted 
directly in the software.
6.2.5.2 Team Building for and by Using Boundary Critique 
In addition to software support, appropriate facilitation and team-building efforts 
were explored so as to help the participants in familiarizing themselves with the 
spirit of boundary critique. Some local meetings were held in different locations in 
Guyana, offering a facilitated opportunity to practice the software tools and simul­
taneously to express feedback on the draft templates. Later, the focus shifted to the 
development of an open educational resource. A pilot course on  Team Working for 
Natural Resource Management should offer the participants both an introduction to 
natural resource management issues and another opportunity to practice the new 
software tools. 
The course development relied on a conceptual framework drawing on two 
traditions: systems thinking informed by CSH, and participatory action research 
(PAR, cf. Fals-Borda  1996) partly informed by critical pedagogy (Freire 1970) . 
CSH appeared relevant to address both the earlier-discussed duality between sys­
tems and situations as well as the PAR dimension of the project, as it has explicitly 
addressed such contexts (see Ulrich  1996) ; PAR appeared relevant to encourage 
active participation of the Guyana stakeholders. 
We mapped these two dimensions of systems thinking and participation onto a stan­
dard project management and learning cycle involving the four basic activities of  observ­
ing, evaluating, planning and acting. This yielded the framework shown in Fig.  6.4 .
The framework understands systems thinking and participation as involving  two 
basic tensions that need to be dealt with in most professional interventions (see 
Reynolds  2008b for a similar framework application to project management in 
international development programmes). The first, horizontal dimension represents 
the tension of ‘system’ versus  ‘situation’ (cf. Figures 6.1 and 6.2). The second, verti­
cal dimension represents the  clash of multiple perspectives that tends to make it 
difficult in practice to achieve mutual understanding among stakeholders, regarding 
both their different views and concerns (’stakes’) and alternative ways to develop 
these into joint action for improvement (‘stakeholding development’). 
The two dimensions may be combined with our earlier distinction of non-discursive
versus discursive boundary questioning (cf. Figs. 6.4 and 6.5 ).  Boundary reflection
may then be said to focus attention on the reference systems that inform our under­
standing of situations, for example, when it comes to evaluating the real-world 
consequences of action (‘system’ versus ‘situation’); whereas  boundary discourse
would focus more on the conflicts arising between stakeholders due to different refer­
ence systems informing their view of the situation and of options for improving it, 
and on the consequent need for acquiring some mutual understanding. Taken 
together, these two basic tensions thus also capture the familiar and rarely avoidable 
tension between individual appreciation of situations and the need for cooperative
action. Even though we rarely achieve shared understanding in the sense of consensus, 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
   
6 	 Critical Systems Heuristics 281 
we have to achieve some kind of shared practice, through decision making based at 
least on mutual (though not shared) understanding – which is what we expect 
boundary discourse to facilitate. 
We used this framework to inform the development of on-line course material 
structured around three main topics: (i) learning to identify stakes and stakeholders; 
(ii) unfolding stakeholding issues; and (iii) developing an individual project dealing 
with a problem situation in Guyana. All three parts should provide practice in 
boundary reflection and discourse, partly supported by the software tools. The proj­
ect ended before the course had been completed, but some of the material is now 
available as an open educational resource (OER). ECOSENSUS became one of the 
first content providers of the Open University’s OER initiative called OpenLearn 
(www.open.ac.uk/openlearn); see the site’s experimental ‘LabSpace’ section. 
The hope is for some of the ECOSENSUS ideas to be taken up by users in the 
growing open-access community and to be adapted for users in different contexts. 
Some of the course material has already been taken up in a subsequent development 
of OERs for the North Rupununi Adaptive Management Plan (NRAMP), again 
using the LabSpace facility of OpenLearn.
6.2.5.3  Final Reflection 
Looking back on the 18-month ECOSENSUS-Guyana study, what have we learned 
about the use of CSH? It was clear from the outset that the project was to explore 
new territory rather than implementing anything definitive; our hope was to learn 
about the limitations in transposing our tools into a totally different cultural context. 
We certainly did! 
Here is a brief summary of the limitations we learned about, structured around 
the four basic CSH sources of influence (which may inform limitations no less than 
success in achieving improvement):
 1. 	 Motivation: There was a certain technocratic bias built into the project to fulﬁ ll 
predetermined objectives around the development of electronic tools 
(Compendium and uDig) for our sponsor, rather than ﬁrst exploring the needs of 
the intended users.
2. 	 Control: There were limitations on time, stafﬁng and other resources (particu­
larly local facilitation and Internet access for our Amerindian colleagues) that 
had been underestimated in the project design and turned out to impede the ‘dis­
tributed’ stakeholder dialogue we aimed to support.
3. 	 Knowledge: There was little experience and expertise with the use of software 
tools such as uDig and Compendium to support dialogue on issues of natural 
resource management among marginalised stakeholders. For example, it proved 
to be difﬁcult to record the content of such conversations in a (partly graphic) 
form and language that would be easily accessible for all participants despite 
differing technical equipment, skills, and cultural backgrounds.
4. 	 Legitimacy: Raising questions of legitimacy proved difﬁcult for some of the par­
ticipants, but also for the authors as there were limited opportunities to gauge 
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effects of the project on third parties, including likely ‘victims’ such as conven­
tional environmental planners. 
Despite such limitations, we found that the use of CSH did make a difference in the 
way software tools and other planning tools were used in this project. It made sure 
that in the course of the project, the original focus on technical issues gradually 
shifted to substantive issues of the stakeholder discourse to be facilitated. In particular, 
it created space for such crucial issues to be deliberated upon as, for example, what 
views and concerns were to inform the maps of the Rupununi land-use situation 
drawn by means of these tools, rather than allowing them (as is more usual) to 
remain hidden away or being treated as mere inconveniences. 
On the other hand, we do not feel we managed to mobilize as much involvement
on the part of the Amerindian participants as we might have hoped. This may be due
in part to the cultural differences we have mentioned, along with the dominance of
software-related technical and conceptual concerns and the limited reach of a short­
term project such as ECOSENSUS. Even so we believe that ECOSENSUS demon­
strated the feasibility of supporting project management by e-social science tools
such as those we explored. Just as important, it demonstrated a simultaneous need for
basing professional intervention and project management on enlarged frameworks
such as the one envisaged in Fig. 6.6. ECOSENSUS certainly made us aware of how
Real world 
situations 
of interest 
Reference 
systems 
of interest Stakeholding 
development 
dealing with 
clashing stakes 
ActingPlanning
Evaluating Observing 
Identifying 
stakes and 
stakeholders 
 Fig. 6.6 ECOSENSUS Framework (Adapted from Reynolds  2008b , p. 779). “Reframing expert
support for development management”, Journal of International Development, Pergamon, with
permission from Elsevier
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long a way current managerial and e-science approaches still have to go so as to really
create spaces for an open and reflective handling of crucial stakeholding issues.
In this early phase of their development it is probably inevitable that the tools them­
selves, rather than the processes they ought to facilitate, are in the centre. As long as
this is so, boundary critique is better thought of as a personal stance and competence
that is acquired primarily through personal study and practice along with dialogue with
others, rather than through intermediate software applications. The third and final sec­
tion of this introduction to CSH discusses some of the personal skills in question.
 6.3  Developing CSH Skills and Significance 
6.3.1 	  Boundary Critique and Personal Competence 
Understanding methodological ideas is not enough, we must also develop some 
personal competencies and attitudes in applying them. As we have thus far focused 
on introducing some core concepts of CSH and reviewing two case studies in their 
light, let us now consider some of the skills and virtues involved in practicing 
boundary critique. 
The basic theme of this concluding section is that boundary reflection and dis­
course have a lot to do with who we are and how we work as professionals, that 
is, with our sense of professional identity and competence. Readers may find it 
meaningful to reflect on the degree to which they are already on their way to 
acquiring such competence, or what they can do to become competent practitio­
ners of boundary critique.
6.3.2 	  Recognising Boundary Judgements – and Keeping 
Them Fluid 
Learning to practice boundary critique begins with understanding the role boundary 
judgements play, that is, with reading some of the sources on CSH. In addition, it 
helps to listen attentively to how people talk and argue in everyday conversations, 
on the bus, at work or in TV discussions; try to  hear the boundary judgements they 
make without apparently being aware of them, and discover how they consequently 
misunderstand one another and talk at cross-purposes. 
Once you have understood the importance of boundary judgements as a factor 
that conditions all our thinking, a critical impetus comes into play: you will then 
no longer want them to operate unrecognised in your thinking. You will prefer to 
control them, rather than allowing them to control you. Likewise, in discussions 
with others, you will probably no longer want their boundary judgements to go 
unrecognised or be imposed on you and others as ‘given’. Rather than seeing them 
withdrawn from any critical consideration, you will want them to be transparent 
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and open to revision.  To understand the role of boundary judgements means to keep 
them under review and fluid rather than allowing them to become ‘hard’ and taken 
for granted. In this respect, we may indeed take the talk of a shift from ’hard’ to 
critical systems thinking quite literally! 
But what is it that contributes towards rendering boundary judgements visible 
and fluid? All the skills that we are going to discuss are contributing to this aim, 
but perhaps the two most basic ones are what CSH calls ‘systematic iteration’ and 
‘systemic triangulation’. 
6.3.2.1  Systematic Iteration of Boundary Judgements 
Our reference systems change over time, as do the situations to which we apply 
them. Some of our boundary judgements may be put into question by the way a 
situation of concern evolves, others by new knowledge we acquire or in discussion 
with others, or we gain new experience through other situations in which we are 
professionally or privately involved, and so on. 
An important point in this natural evolution of our thinking is this: all our bound­
ary judgements are interdependent. We cannot simply adapt a boundary judgement 
(say, as to who should belong to the beneficiaries) to some new piece of information 
and for the rest continue with our previous understanding of the situation, without 
revising the other boundary judgements that constitute our reference system (e.g. 
our measure of improvement might need to be adapted, and consequently the 
resources needed, the decision maker controlling them, the kind of expertise called 
for, and so on).  Whenever we change any one boundary judgement, all the others 
may be in need of change, too.
Consequently, the process of unfolding and questioning boundary judgements
is not a simple matter of observing a standard sequence of boundary questions
such as Table  6.1 and Fig. 6.3 may be understood to suggest it in two slightly
different versions. Rather, boundary critique becomes a cycle of multiple revi­
sions which may take us through  several and changing sequences of boundary
reflection. This is what we mean by describing boundary critique as an iterative
process. 
In the NRUA-Botswana study, the process of evaluating each of the three proj­
ects was essentially iterative in that new insights about any one of the three projects 
prompted the evaluator to revise his reference system for each of the other two 
projects, too. In the ECOSENSUS-Guyana study, it was the gradual progress of 
mutual understanding and better communication, along with equally growing 
awareness of obstacles and difficulties, which provided a main driver for revising 
the authors’ reference systems. 
There are three important aspects to this basic skill of iterating boundary 
judgements: 
–	 Since new insights into the limitations or arbitrariness of our reference system 
may at all times prompt us to revise our boundary judgements, we need not 
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worry so much about ‘getting them right’ from the outset. What matters more is 
that we start developing a sense of the  different kinds of reference system that 
might guide us, before we invest too much time and effort for inquiry and reflec­
tion about any particular boundary judgement.
–	 Since the answers we give to the 12 boundary questions are interdependent, it 
does not really matter where we start. Rather than following some predefined 
order mechanically, we can start with any boundary question that we find par­
ticularly interesting or relevant, or easy to answer, or helpful to stimulate dis­
cussion, and so on. The ensuing boundary reflection or dialogue can then 
follow where the process takes it, as the interdependence of the boundary 
judgements will quite naturally lead us to previously unconsidered boundary 
issues and make sure that we clarify our reference system in terms of all 12 
boundary issues.
–	 Similarly, since boundary revision is an iterative process, when the need for
revising our reference system arises we may start with any of the boundary
judgements concerned. We will then usually see some of our other previous
boundary judgements in a new light, or new boundary issues emerge. So we
can move to those other boundary issues and examine how our reference sys­
tem is changing. Likewise, moving back and forth between ‘ought’ and ‘is’
answers may drive the process of revision, as may any other kind of input that
can help us better understand the conditioned nature of our boundary
judgements.
This is not to say that it is not a good idea for beginners to start with a standard
sequence such as the one suggested in Fig. 6.3 . However, you need not be its slave.
Use it as long as it proves helpful; drop it when it becomes a constraint. As we grow
more accustomed to thinking in terms of boundary critique, we can free ourselves from
following a fixed order and allow more naturally flowing reflection and discussion.
 6.3.2.2  Systemic Triangulation 
The boundary judgements that we continually make (whether consciously or other­
wise) are influenced by two other sets of judgements that are continually at play.
Firstly there are judgements on what we take to constitute reality, for example,
based on what we observe or expect to happen in consequence of our actions.
We call such observations and anticipations  judgements of ‘fact’. In NRUA-
Botswana, they involved, for example, the monitoring of land use through exten­
sive surveys and geographic information systems (GIS). Likewise, for
ECOSENSUS-Guyana, the importance of uDiG as a device for accessing and
making immediate judgements on the ecological well-being of local ecosystems,
was integral to the study.
Secondly, and just as importantly, there are more intuitive judgements on what
we take to constitute improvement, that is, what we individually and collectively
ascribe to the real world in terms of measures of worth. We call such assessments
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judgements of ‘value’. In both NRUA-Botswana and ECOSENSUS-Guyana there
was to be expected considerable variability in value judgements regarding, for
instance, the worth of some notion of pristine nature as compared with the worth
of, say, a natural ‘resource’ such as timber or other forms of land use for human
development.
We have thus three sets of judgements that condition the ways we conceive of 
situations and systems: factual judgements, value judgements, and boundary judge­
ments. Judgements of fact and judgements of value are often said to be interdepen­
dent, but it usually remains unclear what exactly that means and how it is to be 
explained. CSH gives us a precise explanation: ‘facts’ and ‘values’ depend on one 
another as both are conditioned by the same boundary judgements. For example, 
when we expand our boundary judgements regarding what belongs to the relevant 
situation (say, when we recognise a previously ignored condition of success), previ­
ously ignored facts may become relevant; but in the light of new facts, our value 
judgements may suddenly look different and need revision. Similarly, when our 
value judgements change, we will need to revise our boundary judgements accord­
ingly, and in consequence new or different facts become relevant. 
CSH refers to this triadic interplay of reference system, relevant facts and values 
as an eternal triangle that we need to think through, and to its methodological 
employment for critical purposes as  systemic triangulation (Ulrich 2000 , p. 251f; 
2003 , p. 334; and  2005 , p. 6). The term ‘triangulation’ originally refers to the need 
for using at least three triangulation points for surveying land; in the empirical 
social sciences it has come to mean the use of different data bases (gained prefer­
ably by different research approaches) to describe and analyse social issues. 
‘Systemic’ triangulation goes beyond this concept by combining different data 
bases (judgements of fact) with different reference systems (boundary judgements) 
and value sets (judgements of value) to gain a deeper understanding of the selectiv­
ity of claims. 
Systemic triangulation can also be understood as an extended form of systematic 
iteration of boundary judgements. Whereas in the basic form the iteration takes 
place among changing boundary judgements, in the extended form it takes place 
among boundary judgements, factual judgements and value judgements. 
Stepping back from one’s reference system in order to appreciate other perspectives
is perhaps the most challenging attribute of a systems practitioner. This is what 
systemic triangulation is all about. It is a core skill we need to develop in order to 
become competent in boundary critique. The eternal triangle suggests a way to do 
this: we can make it a habit to consider each corner of the triangle in the light of 
the other two, by asking questions such as these: “What new facts become relevant 
if we expand the boundaries of the reference system or modify our value judge­
ments? How do our valuations look if we consider new facts that refer to a modified 
reference system? In what way may our reference system fail to do justice to the 
perspective of different stakeholder groups? Any claim that does not reflect on the 
underpinning ‘triangle’ of boundary judgements, judgements of facts and value 
judgements, risks claiming too much, by not disclosing its built-in selectivity.”
(Ulrich 2002 , p. 42; similarly  2003 , p. 334, and  2005 , p. 6). 
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Systemic triangulation is indeed highly relevant from a critical point of view.
It serves several critical ends: 
–	 It helps us in becoming aware of, and thinking through, the selectivity of our 
claims – a basis for cultivating reflective practice.
–	 It allows us to  explain to others our bias – how our views and claims are condi­
tioned by our assumptions. We can thus qualify our proposals carefully, so that 
they gain in credibility.
–	 It allows us to  see through the selectivity of the claims of  others and thus to be 
better prepared to assess their merits and limitations properly.
–	  It improves communication, for it enables us to better understand our differences 
with others. When we find it impossible to reach through rational discussion 
some shared views and proposals, this is not necessarily so because some of the 
parties do not want to listen to us or have bad intentions but more often, because 
the parties are arguing from a basis of diverging boundary judgements and thus 
cannot reasonably expect to arrive at identical judgements of fact and value. And 
finally, as a result of all the above implications
–	 It is apt to promote among all the parties involved a sense of modesty and mutual 
tolerance that may facilitate productive cooperation; for once we have under­
stood the principle of systemic triangulation, we cannot help but realise that 
nobody has a monopoly for getting their facts and values right, and that accord­
ingly it is of little help simply to accuse those who disagree with us to have got 
their facts and values wrong! 
6.3.3 	 Towards a New Ethos of Professional Responsibility 
The five critical elements mentioned above amount to a  new ethos of responsibility
for systems practice, and for professional practice in general. It says that the ratio­
nality of professional claims and arguments is to be measured not by the impossible 
avoidance of justification deficits but by the degree to which we deal with such 
deficits in a transparent, self-critical, and self-limiting way (Ulrich  1993 , p. 587). 
It is a stance that takes the ‘enemies of the systems approach’ no less seriously than 
the different reference systems of those involved in an intervention (cf. Reynolds 
2004 , p. 550f). Let us conclude with three pertinent reflections. 
6.3.3.1 	 “Context Matters”: Working with the Tension of System 
and Situation 
The phrase ‘context matters’ provides perhaps the simplest and most generic 
description of what it means to develop competence in boundary critique. First, it 
prompts the question: What is the relevant context? or simply:  Which context mat­
ters? Second, it prompts the question: What makes this context matter more than 
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other conceivable ones? or simply:  Why does it matter? The first question raises 
issues of meaning and relevance; it invites us to reflect on our understanding of ‘the 
problem’ (the ‘situation’) and ways to improve it. The second question raises issues 
of validity and rationality; it urges us to reflect on the validity claims involved in 
our ‘systems’ maps and designs and to examine the arguments that support or chal­
lenge them. 
As evidenced in the two case studies, getting to grips with real-world situations 
of intervention does not usually allow us to stay within the pristine conceptual 
world of our systems methodologies. Rather, it compels us to face the basic tension 
between ‘system’ and ‘situation’, by continuously questioning our systems maps 
and designs as to how selective they are in capturing the situation, and our notion 
of the situation as to what options there are for our underlying reference system. By 
consciously working with the tension of ‘system’ and ‘situation’, either can play 
a critical role for the other; together, they can help us develop and maintain some 
healthy self-critical distance to our own professional assumptions, findings, and 
conclusions. 
Boundary critique, then, is not just a process of delimiting and arguing our 
systems conceptions. It should equally inform our notion of the relevant problem 
situation – of the ‘context that matters’. Our systems maps and designs can hardly 
be better than the notion of the context that informs them! But whereas in the case 
of our systems maps and designs, boundary critique will usually require a system­
atic and explicit effort of boundary unfolding and questioning, in the case of our 
notion of the context it will often tend to be more intuitive and implicit. We all 
bring into professional interventions a background of personal experiences and 
skills that shape our views of the context, and it will hardly ever be possible that 
we render all those background assumptions fully explicit. What matters more is 
that we develop a sense of openness and flexibility with respect to the differing 
contexts that matter to different people, and are prepared to revise our initial 
notion of the relevant context. 
Regarding this important aspect of personal competence, our experience is that
boundary critique works best as a reflective framework that most of the time
operates in the background – a set of concepts and questions we need not talk
about all the time but should simply allow to inform our critical thinking. In our 
communication with others, we can probably best convey the spirit of boundary
critique by the example we give in handling our boundary judgements carefully
and limiting our claims accordingly, whereas constant talk about boundary judge­
ments may only cause others to switch off. Even in individual reflection, once we
have understood the role of boundary assumptions it is hardly possible to ‘forget’
their importance.
Thus seen, boundary critique ultimately becomes a Socratic professional
stance rather than an explicit technique. It encourages a  new methodological
modesty that expresses itself in the way we qualify our claims and deal with those
of others. Such a stance will also make a difference in the way we meet people
concerned about a situation who have no special expertise and skills: we will
understand and let them feel that we are prepared to meet them on an equal foot­
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ing. Rather than putting them in a situation of incompetence, as professional
practice often does, we will treat them as competent partners in exploring the
context that matters (Ulrich  2000) . When it comes to the contextual assumptions
informing our views, ordinary citizens have no disadvantage as compared to the
experts.
6.3.3.2 	 “Deep Complementarism”: The Significance of Using CSH 
in Support of Other Methodologies and Methods 
The new ethos of responsibility that we associate with boundary critique has also 
consequences for our cooperation with other professionals. It should inspire in us a 
new openness regarding the methodologies others use. Whatever our own preferred 
methodology may be in a certain situation, it cannot supersede a careful handling 
of the eternal triangle that is at work in all our professional findings and conclu­
sions. In this respect, we all meet as equals, regardless of the methodologies we 
master. Consequently, we may develop and practice skills of boundary critique in 
conjunction with any kind of methodology, whether it is a ‘hard’, ‘soft’ or ‘critical’ 
systems methodology or any other kind of approach. 
Developing competence in boundary critique thus goes hand in hand with a 
methodological stance of ‘deep’ methodological complementarism (Ulrich 2003 , 
p. 337f): while the problem situations we face as professionals change and may 
require different methodologies, the  argumentation tasks we face remain basically 
the same. Whatever professional tools we use, in the end we need to convince the 
parties concerned that we have got our ‘facts’, ‘values’ and ‘boundary judgements’ 
right, that is, conducive to improvement  in the eyes of the parties concerned. 
Professionals cannot delegate this act of approval to themselves; no methodology, 
no method, no kind of expertise can justify it. All that professional competence can 
contribute is to lay open to those concerned the assumptions on which it relies, the 
consequences they may have, and the options available for alternative proposals. 
Since unfolding and questioning such selectivity is the core business of boundary 
critique, must we not conclude that all sound professional practice requires some
skills of boundary critique, whether in explicit CSH terms or not? 
CSH accordingly proposes that boundary critique should become part of the 
critically reflective skills of every professional and should also be considered a core 
competence of group leaders and facilitators. Particularly in interventions in which 
disagreements about essential questions arise, appropriate space for boundary 
reflection and discourse should be set up, both among those involved in the inter­
vention on the one hand and among those involved and other parties concerned but 
not involved on the other hand. 
Consequently, CSH aims not to replace but to  complement the use of other meth­
odologies, with a view to supporting reflective practice. We consider it one of the
strengths of CSH that it is thoroughly grounded philosophically and methodologi­
cally yet does not constrain the user’s flexibility with respect to the specific approaches
and tools that one may prefer and master. It thus enlarges rather than replaces the
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specific professional skills of its users, and thereby also can provide a common lan­
guage for reflective practice across different professions and methodologies.
6.3.3.3 	 “Seeing the World Through the Eyes of Others”: Systems Thinking 
as Constructive Critique 
Revisiting the two quotations introducing this chapter, we may finally ask: What 
insight and value is there in CSH that contributes to the aspiration of  ‘seeing the 
world through the eyes of another’? And moreover: What insight and value does it 
contribute to the need for being  constructively critical of the worlds we see ‘through 
the eyes others’, as well as of our own worlds? 
Answering these two questions is the topic of the entire chapter. But perhaps we 
can summarise the particular competence and ethos boundary critique is meant to 
convey to the reader a bit differently. It starts by recognising that boundary judge­
ments are not an invention of CSH but are operational out there in the messy world 
of professional practice, waiting to be unfolded and questioned! You may choose 
to ignore them, but does that make you a better researcher and professional? 
Remember the mountain climber who was asked why he had climbed a mountain; 
his answer was, ‘because it exists’. Similarly, the fact that boundary judgements 
exist and underpin all our claims should be sufficient impetus to explore them. That 
they exist may be bad news at first, for they may put into question many of our 
cherished ideas about competent research and practice; but if we handle them care­
fully, they may also offer opportunities for gaining a deeper understanding of what 
it means to be a good professional. 
As you, the reader, learn to practice boundary critique and grow more familiar 
with it, you will gradually discover its power to stimulate your thinking in new,
constructively critical ways. You will discover that it helps you in better appreciat­
ing what others say and why it differs from your views, but also why people so 
often talk past one another and are intolerant. Likewise, you will discover that the 
cogency and credibility of your own proposals and arguments increase to the same 
degree to which boundary critique makes you appreciate their conditioned nature 
and limit them accordingly. 
What is at stake is the quality of our professional thinking and communication 
with others. If that is reason enough for you to read more about boundary critique, 
you may want to start with a more comprehensive and detailed discussion of the 
quest for competence in systems research and practice than is possible here (Ulrich 
2001) . Some down-to-earth guidelines for getting started with boundary critique 
are equally available elsewhere (Ulrich  2000) . But ultimately, as with all skills, the 
only way to learn boundary critique is by trying, and by experiencing the difference 
it makes in practice, for yourself.  “Dare to articulate your own boundary judge­
ments and to question those of others!” must be the beginner’s motto. 
Boundary critique (dare we say?) is never a bad idea. It reminds us that a well­
understood systems approach begins and ends with the questions we ask, not with 
the answers we give. 
  
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
   
   
 
  
   
   
  
 
    
   
   
  
   
  
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
6 Critical Systems Heuristics 291 
 References 
Achterkamp, M.C., & Vos, J.F J. (2007). Critically identifying stakeholders: evaluating boundary 
critique as a vehicle for stakeholder identification.  Systems Research and Behavioral Science
24(1), 3–14.
Ackoff, R.L. (1981).  Creating the Corporate Future: Plan or Be Planned For. New York: Wiley.
Berardi, A., Bernard, C., Buckingham-Shum, S., Ganapathy, S., Mistry, J., Reynolds, M.,
Ulrich, W. (2006). The ECOSENSUS project: co-evolving tools, practices and open content 
for participatory natural resource management. 2nd International Conference on e-Social 
Science, 28–30 June, Manchester, UK. Presentation and full paper available in the website
of the National Centre for e-Social Science (NCeSS) of the Economic & Social Research 
Council (ESRC),  http://www.ncess.ac.uk/research/sgp/ecocensus. Also available in the
Open University’s Open Research Online site, http://oro.open.ac.uk/2692/. 
Carr, S. & Oreszczyn, S. (2003). Critical systems heuristics: a tool for the inclusion of ethics and 
values in complex policy decisions. In  Ethics as a Dimension of Agrifood Policy, Proceedings 
of the Fourth Congress of the European Society for Agricultural and Food Ethics, Toulouse, 
France, 20–22 March 2003. Paper available in the website of the  European Society for 
Agricultural and Food Ethics (EurSafe),  http://technology.open.ac.uk/cts/EURSAFE4-CSH­
paper.pdf. 
Chambers, R. (1994a). The origin and practice of participatory rural appraisal. World Development,
22(7), 953–969.
Chambers, R. (1994b). Participatory rural appraisal: challenges, potentials and paradigm.  World 
Development 22(10), 1437–1454.
Chambers, R. (1997). Whose Reality Counts? Putting the Last First. London: Intermediate 
Technology Publications.
Checkland, P.B. (1981).  Systems Thinking, Systems Practice. Chichester, UK, Wiley.
Churchman, C.W. (1968).  The Systems Approach. New York: Delta/Dell Publishing.
Churchman, C.W. (1971).  The Design of Inquiring Systems: Basic Concepts of Systems and 
Organizations. New York: Basic Books.
Churchman, C.W. (1979).  The Systems Approach and its Enemies. New York: Basic Books.
Conklin, J. (2005). Dialogue Mapping. Chichester, UK: Wiley.
Dewey, J. (1925). The development of American pragmatism.  Studies in the History of Ideas
2(Supplement), 353–377.
Fals-Borda, O. (1996). Power/knowledge and emancipation.  Systems Practice 9 (2), 177–181.
Freire, P. (1970).  Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York and London: Continuum.
Habermas, J. (1972). Knowledge and Human Interests. London: Heinemann.
Habermas, J. (1984/87). The Theory of Communicative Action. 2 Volumes, Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press. 
James, W. (1907).  Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. New York: Longman.
Kant, I. (1787). Critique of Pure Reason (2nd ed). Transl. by N.K. Smith, New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1965 (orig. Macmillan, New York, 1929).
Korzybski, A. (1933). A Non-Aristotelian System and its necessity for rigour in mathematics and 
physics. In A. Korzybski,  Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and 
General Semantics, Lakeville, CT: International Non-Aristotelian Library, pp. 747–761.
Peirce, C.S (1878). How to make our ideas clear.  Popular Science Monthly 12(January), 
386–302. 
Reynolds, M. (1998). ‘Unfolding’ natural resource-use information systems: fieldwork in 
Botswana.  Systemic Practice and Action Research 11 (2), 127–152.
Reynolds, M. (2004). Churchman and Maturana: enriching the notion of self-organisation for 
social design. Systemic Practice and Action Research 17 (6), 539–556.
Reynolds, M. (2007). Evaluation based on critical systems heuristics. In B. Williams and I. Imam 
(eds.), Systems Concepts in Evaluation: An Expert Anthology, Point Reyes, CA: Edge Press, 
pp. 101–122.
  
 
    
 
   
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
  
 
 
   
  
   
 
  
 
   
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
292 W. Ulrich and M. Reynolds 
Reynolds, M. (2008a). Getting a grip: a critical systems framework for corporate responsibility. 
Systems Research and Behavioral Science 25 (3), 383–395.
Reynolds, M. (2008b). Reframing expert support for development management.  Journal of 
International Development 20 (6), 768–782.
Reynolds, M., Berardi, A., Bernard, C., Bachler, M., Buckingham-Shum, S., Mistry, J., Ulrich, W.
(2007). ECOSENSUS: developing collaborative learning systems for stakeholding develop­
ment in environmental planning.  Curriculum, Teaching & Student Support Conference, The 
Open University, Milton Keynes, 1–2 May 2007. Paper available in the Open University’s 
Open Research Online site, http://oro.open.ac.uk/8580/. Also available through the site of the 
Knowledge Media Institute,  http://oro.open.ac.uk/view/faculty_dept/kmi.html. 
Ulrich, W. (1983). Critical Heuristics of Social Planning: A New Approach to Practical 
Philosophy. Bern, Switzerland, and Stuttgart, Germany: Haupt. Paperback reprint version, 
Chichester, UK: Wiley, 1994 (same pagination).
Ulrich, W. (1987). Critical heuristics of social systems design.  European Journal of Operational 
Research 31 (3), 276–283.
Ulrich, W. (1988a). Systems thinking, systems practice, and practical philosophy: a programme of 
research. Systems Practice 1 (2), 137–163.
Ulrich, W. (1988b). Churchman’s ‘process of unfolding’ – its significance for policy analysis and 
evaluation.  Systems Practice 1 (4), 415–428.
Ulrich, W. (1993). Some difficulties of ecological thinking, considered from a critical systems 
perspective: a plea for critical holism.  Systems Practice 6 (6), 583–611.
Ulrich, W. (1996).  A Primer to Critical Systems Heuristics for Action Researchers. Hull, UK: 
University of Hull, Centre for Systems Studies.
Ulrich, W. (2000). Reflective practice in the civil society: the contribution of critically systemic 
thinking. Reflective Practice 1 (2), 247–268.
Ulrich, W. (2001). The quest for competence in systemic research and practice.  Systems Research
and Behavioral Science 18 (1), 3–28.
Ulrich, W. (2002). Boundary critique. In H.G. Daellenbach and R.L. Flood (eds.),  The Informed 
Student Guide to Management Science, London: Thomson Learning, pp. 41–42.
Ulrich, W. (2003). Beyond methodology choice: critical systems thinking as critically systemic 
discourse. Journal of the Operational Research Society 54 (4), 325–342.
Ulrich, W. (2004). C. West Churchman, 1913-2004 (obituary).  Journal of the Operational 
Research Society, 55 (11), 1123–1129.
Ulrich, W. (2005). A brief introduction to critical systems heuristics (CSH). Paper available in the 
Open University’s  ECOSENSUS project web site,  http://projects.kmi.open.ac.uk/ecosensus/ 
about/csh.html, or in the CSH section of Werner Ulrich’s Home Page,  http://wulrich.com/csh. 
html. 
Ulrich, W. (2006). Critical pragmatism: a new approach to professional and business ethics. In L. 
Zsolnai (ed.), Interdisciplinary Yearbook of Business Ethics, Vol. 1, Oxford, UK, and Bern, 
Switzerland: Peter Lang, pp. 53–85.
Ulrich, W. (2007a). Philosophy for professionals: towards critical pragmatism. Journal of the 
Operational Research Society,  58(8), 1109–1113.
Ulrich, W. (2007b). The greening of pragmatism (three reflections on the past, present, and future 
of critical pragmatism). Ulrich’s Bimonthly, March–April, May–June, and September–October 
2007, http://wulrich.com/bimonthly_march2007.html. 
Ulrich, W. (2008). The mainstream concept of reflective practice and its blind spot.  Ulrich’s 
Bimonthly, March–April 2008, http://wulrich.com/bimonthly_march2008.html. 
Žižek, S. (1989). The Sublime Object of Ideology. London: Verso.
